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Better financial regulation in Europe: a joint commitment
The response to the crisis
The focus on regulation is not a new feature of the EU policy agenda. In response to the 
crisis, efforts at improving the regulatory framework have figured prominently among 
the priorities for action. This focus was obviously linked to the widespread recognition 
that regulatory gaps were at the heart of the excessive risk-taking and the slippages in 
compliance that contributed to the crisis, or at least to some aspects of the crisis.
Since then, a lot was invested, and much has been achieved in strengthening and 
improving the financial regulatory and supervisory frameworks in Europe. 
First, based on the recommendations of the De Larosière Report, a robust new finan-
cial architecture was designed and put in place. Three new agencies were born, emphati-
cally called the European Supervisory Authorities, covering the fields of banking (EBA), 
insurance and pension funds (EIOPA), and the securities markets (ESMA). These agen-
cies revamped and consolidated the activities of coordination and consultation previously 
carried out by the corresponding Inter-agencies – Intergovernmental Committees (the 
so-called Lamfalussy Committes). However, new functions and new prerogatives were 
also added, encouraging new ambitions and goals.  It was felt then, quite rightly, that in a 
financial market that had been growing increasingly European and integrated, a set of new 
institutions should be created, and that addressing systemic risk required a new level and 
space of macro-prudential responsibility (the European Systemic Risk Board). Moreover, 
promoting coherence and coordination – it was agreed- required establishing a set of “Eu-
ropean systems” of national authorities, which would bring together the many, and varied, 
regulatory players acting at the national level.  
Second, the smooth operation of an integrated market requires harmonization and 
convergence of norms and practises. The EU legislators then and the ESAs engaged them-
selves, in consultation with member states and national authorities, to create a Europe-
an layer of norms and legislative frameworks. They called it the “Single Rule-book”, a 
catch-phrase that attracted the sympathy and support of market participants. A “single 
rule-book” would be clearly welcome, considering the burdensome diverse and sometimes 
contradictory prudential norms that affect the efficiency and the flexibility of market op-
erations, particularly for cross-border activities. In reality, the European regulatory frame-
work, or “Rule-book” –as it is called- is not, and has not become, more “single”. Simply, 
it has added an additional level of norms and practises, i.e. the European level. And there-
fore, it has added more costs and burdens. Without necessarily substituting for, or simpli-
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fying the underlying national or sectorial cobweb of regimes and players, as it was hoped. 
Sometimes the European regulatory activism has provoked as a reaction, the practise of 
“gold-plating” at the national level, i.e. the provision of additional and more stringent 
national rules, a defensive strategy of national regulators conducted in the name of “na-
tional specificities” and the search for “more quality”. Rather, gold-plating often represents 
merely a way for national regulators to uphold their prerogatives. 
Third, the crisis stirred a new wave of norms and legislation, a “landslide” as it was 
called, or “flood” of prudential norms, covering a wide range of aspects, from capital 
requirements to crisis resolution, from transparency to distribution and compliance. In 
a matter of a few years, under the impulse of the Barroso Commission and the French 
Commissioner Michel Barnier, approximately 50 new legal instruments were introduced 
into the “European Rule-book”. Many of them were translated into national legislation, 
often with “gold-plating”. 
This strong wave should not have come as a surprise. It represented in fact a natural, 
almost Pavlovian, reaction to the crisis. It corresponded to a healthy push towards bal-
ance sheet correction and deleveraging. It was also supported by the prevailing sentiment 
of the public opinion and the policy makers. In the end the new regulatory round led 
to overshooting and over-regulation, with unintended and undesirable consequences on 
financial intermediaries, and above all on the volume of credit available for the economy 
and society.  Instead of alleviating the crisis, it made it worse.
the change in climate: the response to over-reregulation 
As the European economy was settling into a stagnation mode, of stationary growth 
and faltering inflation, with down-side risks of deflation, there emerged concerns that 
the European economy would drift into a sort of Japanese syndrome of long-term de-
pression and decline. The “credit crunch” and the downsizing of the balance sheets of 
financial players, including –and importantly- central banks, were held responsible for 
the slow and uncertain recovery. “Austerity policies” came under attack, as they were 
considered often counter-productive, or at least excessive and unbalanced. The “regula-
tory tsunami” was placed at the centre stage among the main culprits. Its pro-cyclical 
and recessionary impact was highlighted and blamed. The pendulum swung then in 
the other direction. A better balance between stability and growth was predicated and 
sought. Confidence had to be restored, not only in the financial sector, but above all in 
the economy at large, through more access to credit and better financing. The mood and 
perceptions of the public opinion also shifted significantly. 
The turning point took place in the second part of the year 2014, six years on from 
the inception of the crisis, in correspondence with the changes that occurred at the top 
of the European Commission and the start of a new Legislature after the European 
parliamentary elections. A determining contribution to this change of philosophy and 
climate came from the Italian Presidency of the EU in the second half of the year 2014. It 
was the Italian Presidency that coined the successful slogan “Finance for Growth”, mark-
ing a significant departure from the preceding policy thrust. The leit-motif ceased to be 
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that of the previous phase of the crisis, i.e. “reigning in unbridled finance and pursuing 
stability”, or even “deleveraging, less finance, more real economy”. On the contrary, 
unleashing financial resources and innovation became the main driver of the recovery. 
A new partnership between finance and the real economy was called for. “More finance, 
and more real economic growth”. Correspondingly, the emphasis was on removing the 
obstacles to financing and economic growth. Among them, the regulatory frameworks, 
in so far as they constrain funding, particularly for investment and SMEs. 
There is ample evidence of this radical change in climate. “Legislate less and legislate 
better” is the motto of the new Juncker Commission, inaugurated in 2014. “Better Regula-
tion” is a flagship initiative of the new Commission, under the responsibility of Vice-pres-
ident Timmermans. Commissioner Jonathan Hill proudly announced in a recent speech 
“in 2015 we only brought forward one fifth of the legislation that was typical in work 
programmes of an average year under the previous Commission”. Danielle Nouy, Chair 
of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, rightly pointed out that 
“micro-prudential supervision needs to be complemented by a macro-prudential perspec-
tive”. This is the task of the ESRB. It requires looking beyond the narrow focus of specific 
financial activities supervision. It requires focusing on the interlinkages and the collective 
behaviour of financial institutions, the potential knock-on effects between them, and the 
broad influences that the financial sector has on the wider economy, and vice versa. This 
is understandably a complex and formidable job. One in which we are still threading on 
uncertain and fledgling steps. In the financial sector, it is widely recognised that we are 
still far from getting the balance right between managing risk and encouraging growth or 
enabling investment. A review of the ESRB and of the ESAs has been foreseen and carried 
out in 2014 under the terms of the legislation that created the new institutions. This review 
represented a great opportunity for learning from past mistakes, introducing the necessary 
corrections and re-launching the financial supervisory architecture of the EU. However, 
the review did not propose significant changes, and prudently deferred concrete and bold 
action to a later stage, when more evidence would become available.
In 2015, as part of the action plan for the Capital Markets Union adopted by the 
Commission in September, a “call for evidence” was issued on the cumulative impact of 
rules in the financial services sector. The idea of the call was to collect views, suggestions, 
and above all hard evidence on the regulatory burden, and its likely impact on financial 
intermediaries, in terms of costs, consistency, coherence, clarity and non-ambiguity. 
Moreover, the call should make it apparent how regulation affects costs, competitiveness 
and profitability. “If hard evidence shows there are unnecessary regulatory burdens that 
damage our ability to invest, if there are duplications and inconsistencies, we should be 
ready to change things” promised Lord Hill. 
Frankly, the “philosophy” of the call for evidence does not make it clear why the 
burden of proof of over-regulation should be passed on to market agents and custom-
ers. As if their claims, and possibly complaints, were not sufficiently substantiated. In a 
context where the stagnating economy, the debt overhang, the burden of non-perform-
ing loans, and the low margin of profitability impose serious constraints on financing 
mechanisms, the pro-cyclical impact of additional regulation should be self-evident, 
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and beyond question. However, the consultation launched by the Commission is a use-
ful opportunity not to miss. It should provide valuable insights on how specifically the 
regulatory burden impacts on financing and useful feedback therefore on how to prior-
itize and streamline the necessary corrections. 
The Commission also launched in 2015 a review into the effect of the Capital Re-
serve Requirement, looking at how it is affecting the banks’ ability to lend to businesses, 
infrastructure development, and other long-term investment projects, paying specific 
attention to the financing requirements of local businesses and local communities. 
the origin of the casmef study
It is in this new climate that we introduce the study on “Costs and Benefits of Financial 
Regulation in the EU”, which is included in this volume. Actually, the Italian Banking 
Insurance and Finance Federation (FeBAF) by undertaking such a study anticipated the 
new climate and is now capable to contribute to the current discussion on the basis of a 
solid analytical framework and some evidence. In 2014 FeBAF commissioned a study on 
the cost of regulation, asking a prominent group of economists at the Centro Arcelli per 
gli studi monetary e finanziari (CASMEF), led by Giorgio Di Giorgio of Luiss Univer-
sity, to review the literature and propose an appropriate conceptual framework to deal 
with the question. The study is part of the programme of work of the newly established 
“Osservatorio FeBAF sulla distribuzione finanziaria” (Monitoring system on financial dis-
tribution). The Osservatorio gathers the main associations and networks in Italy dealing 
with the distribution of financial products and services with the aim of promoting a 
common culture, disseminating information and innovation, and speaking as much as 
possible with a common voice with stakeholders and policy makers.  
This project has many challenging features, which reflect themselves in the outcome 
of the study.
First, creating a “common home” for all those communities institutions companies 
and individuals who have a stake in the smooth and efficient working of the financial 
market. Not only banks and insurance companies. Also, pension funds, real estate and 
asset managers, equity and debt funds, etc. Not only companies, but also networks and 
individuals like financial promoters, insurance agents, business advisors, brokers, legal 
support services, etc.
Second, engaging in an open and constructive dialogue with a view to showing the 
common and crosscutting interests at stake, beyond the immediate and sectional concerns, 
and their strong links and overlaps with the interests of consumers, savers and the public 
good. Fundamental in this dialogue is the active participation of regulators and central 
banks, whose interests and mandates are perfectly aligned with the ultimate goal of mak-
ing the market work, upholding its role and value, and correcting its imperfections.
Finally, building a common “conscience” and culture of advanced and responsible 
performance. A culture based on shared values, integrity, competition and the principles 
of the market economy. This requires investing in common activities, joint studies and 
reciprocal learning and education. 
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Not surprisingly, having these goals in mind led to a programme of work where 
the impact of regulation plays a central role. Regulation in fact is not simply the busi-
ness of regulators and the “regulated” market participants. It is an essential feature of 
a well-functioning market that promotes effectiveness and guarantees the satisfaction 
of customers and stakeholders. Moreover, regulation is not an end in itself, but rather 
a tool to “educate” and produce good behaviour, and therefore ultimately change and 
impact on minds and hearts. 
Therefore analysing the impact of regulation requires a partnership approach and a 
Socratic dialogue or joint learning process. Which is what we have stimulated and set 
in motion at the Osservatorio thanks to this study. The objective is to look at not only 
the coverage and comprehensiveness of norms and rules, but at their actual impact in 
terms of implementation and compliance. Not only at the first round effects, but also at 
outcomes in terms of market operation. Not only the pathology of abuses, complaints 
and sanctions, but also the physiology of good or “better practises”. Not only at the 
micro-impact on individuals, but also at the macro-impact on whole sectors, like the 
SMEs, and the economy at large.
With this perspective in mind, the research agenda has become daunting and ex-
tremely complex. Also fascinating. Underneath the simple question: “what are the costs 
and benefits of regulation?” lie formidable conceptual analytical and measurement issues.
lessons learned and first results
That is why the results of this study appear original, interesting and path breaking. Even 
though one might think that they have only scratched the surface, and provided more 
questions than answers, the analytical framework has got a firm footing, the current 
state of the literature has been reviewed, and the data collection exercise has started.  
In Chapter 1, the different approaches to supervision were surveyed based on the 
vast academic literature of the turn of the century. The resulting picture is one of increas-
ing complexity variety and variations. Confronting this discussion with the real world 
and the working of financial markets, particularly in the testing times of the great crisis, 
no single model seems to stand out as performing better than the others. Analytical ef-
forts aimed at institutional engineering seem to have produced rather meagre results, 
except for a few useful guideposts. Among them, the need to link micro-prudential with 
macro-prudential regulation, in order to take into account the fallacy of composition 
argument. Or the attention to be paid to possible conflicts of interests, which cannot 
be avoided altogether, but should be carefully managed for the sake of credibility and 
reputation. An example of this is in the operational firewalls that were set up at the ECB 
to separate the Single Supervisory Mechanism from the conduct of monetary policy, so 
that the independence of the latter can be visibly safeguarded.
In Chapter 2, the analysis focused on the cost of supervision. Here the literature is 
much less forthcoming and instructive, probably because the issue is much more intrac-
table. The costs of supervision are in fact quite difficult to identify, assess and measure, 
and therefore to analyse. The study provides useful classifications on the different nature 
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and features of such costs, from direct costs, incurred by regulatory agencies, and gener-
ally paid by the industry, to the indirect or incremental costs that weigh on financial 
intermediaries, banks and practitioners, for reasons of compliance, information, report-
ing, including human resources, and the related opportunity costs of foregone profits. It 
is worth noting that the two sets of costs are generally correlated, creating a dangerous 
spiral that does not necessarily feed more stability and public trust. Much more difficult 
to analyse are the distortion costs, inherently linked to regulation, and even more all the 
benefits of regulation, in terms of transaction costs, trust, information and consumers’ 
protection.    The results of the cross-country comparison of supervision costs, albeit still 
incomplete and preliminary, show the great potential and usefulness of such analysis, 
but also the constraints posed by data availability and comparability. Also interesting 
is the analysis of micro-authorities in the case of Italy, showing what is required for a 
thoroughgoing exploration of the field of investigation and the costs-benefits of a decen-
tralised or fragmented structure. 
 The third, and last, chapter goes to the heart of the matter: the quality of supervi-
sion, its effectiveness and sustainability. Leaving aside a few important exercises led by 
the IMF, not much has been done on this very significant front. However, the tide is 
turning and a new attention is emerging on this issue. Based on more and better data, 
indicators have started to be compiled, both effort or input indicators, and effect or 
output indicators, looking at the impact of regulation on the performance of the fi-
nancial system. And indicators are essential for benchmarking, assessment, testing and 
review, including the application of ratings. The chapter concludes with statements that 
might probably disappoint the most ambitious expectations: “our preliminary analysis 
… does not seem to indicate a correlation between higher direct cost of supervision … 
and higher benefits produced by supervisory actions”. Which simply means that there 
is scope for improving effectiveness and performance. But above all, the study shows 
that there is scope for investing more in the analysis of the effectiveness, the costs and 
benefits of supervision, and that this investment would contribute significantly to the 
accountability, reputation and independence of the regulatory system. 
the new wave of eu reforms: banking union and capital markets union
Since our project started in 2014 fundamental changes have taken place in the institu-
tional context within which European supervisory systems operate. Europe has made 
great steps forward towards more financial integration and ambitious reforms in eco-
nomic governance. I refer here mainly to the Banking Union and the Capital Markets 
Union. These two great leaps forward in particular reverberate considerably on the fu-
ture of supervision, and should determine a drastic re-orientation of the policy analysis 
on the effectiveness of regulation. Indeed, they should be considered game changers in 
the way we approach supervision.  
The Banking Union has redesigned the European supervisory system giving to the 
ECB the responsibility to supervise EU banks. The establishment of the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism set in motion a process of transfer of prerogatives from the national to 
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the European level. The same effect was produced by the new banking resolution regime 
and the system of deposit guarantees. Overcoming fragmentation duplication and over-
laps has become a key priority of regulatory reform. The demand for “single rulebooks” 
that are really “single” has become more pressing and substantial. This process has di-
rectly concerned Countries, which belong to the Eurosystem. But it also spread out to 
affect non-Euro countries, who demanded standardisation of regulatory practises and 
implementation across different national jurisdiction, and a “single book of regulatory 
practises” or single supervisory “Handbook”. The Banking Union was decided designed 
and implemented in its main constituent parts in a very short time, under the impulse 
of the reaction to the sovereign debt crisis of 2012. Now the process has to trickle down 
to the level of specific aspects and areas of legislation, and to the details. And – as the 
proverb says- the devil is in the detail. 
The Capital Market Union is an equally ambitious project, if not more. It started 
much later, and –admittedly- will take time to materialise and measure up to its level of 
intended ambition. The corresponding Action Plan issued by the European Commis-
sion in 2015 spans the entire legislature up to 2019, and covers a wide spectrum of fields 
and actions. Here too the implications for regulation and supervision are far-reaching. 
In the short term, it calls for an urgent intervention to re-calibrate the regulatory frame-
works for insurance (Solvency 2) and banks (CRR), to enable institutional investors 
to play an active role in capital markets. However, in the medium to long-term it calls 
into question vast and wide-open regulatory spaces, like insolvency regimes, tax meas-
ures, securities legislation, pension funds, corporate governance, venture capital, etc. 
Promoting convergence and harmonisation in such terrains, now jealously protected 
by national bureaucracies, will be hard controversial and painful.    Besides this opera-
tion concerns the whole EU, i.e. the 28 member countries, including non-Euro capital 
markets, like the City of London that plays a leading and most advanced role in Europe, 
and the world. But faster and more sweeping reforms (e.g. on the financial architecture, 
by creating a single supervisor for the Eurozone) could be undertaken by the Euro 
countries, for which the capital markets union represent an essential step towards com-
pletion, and stabilisation, of the economic and monetary union (see the Report of the 
Five Presidents).
Banking Union and Capital Markets Union are the most advanced and ambitious 
processes of economic integration underway in Europe. They will engage profoundly 
and for a long time national and European agencies, governments, regulators and fi-
nancial markets, parliaments and the public opinion, the financial industry, etc. Within 
these processes, the questions of the supervisory institutions, the regulatory frameworks, 
their costs and effectiveness will figure prominently in the priority agendas of the various 
players. That is why I believe it is fundamental and timely that great progress is made in 
bringing forward the questions discussed here by promoting further study, data collec-
tion and testing.
I expect that in the future pressures will build up towards evaluating and improv-
ing the effectiveness of regulatory systems. These pressures will come from two ends: 
from above, and from below. From the first perspective, striving for standardisation 
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simplification streamlining and convergence will imply that rules are harmonised, and 
regulators cooperate more. They might even centralise their operations or merge.  From 
the second perspective, more power will be given to citizens and economic agents. This 
means individuals, companies or savers, financial or non-financial enterprises, multi-
nationals and local communities, etc. These players have to be enabled to challenge 
the regulatory obstacles to the free circulation of savings and cross-border operations. 
Empowerment might find its way to more Court actions and initiatives, of the kind 
that in the 1970’s and the 1980’s brought about the wave of capital market liberalizations 
in the UK and the US, and their success stories. It might even lead to mutual recogni-
tion and freedom for the individual to adopt the framework of its choice, determining 
regime competition, portability of prerogatives and rights, competitive de-regulation. 
The better regulated and better functioning markets then will compete with the others 
attracting more resources and activities.
In sum, more competition from below and more cooperation from above, or a bal-
anced mix of the two. All these processes require more and better information, more 
transparency and policy evaluation of the regulatory systems in Europe. The research 
agenda that this study has started to explore will have to be carried further and deeper, 
with determination and commitment.
implications for further work and a proposal
The stage is set and the time is ripe for bringing together the many and different indica-
tions drawn from the CASMEF study. They converge towards suggesting a promising 
way forward. Further work along the lines followed in this essay would first satisfy the 
research and knowledge requirements that it has not been possible to address in the 
present study. This involves among other things the assessment and evaluation of the 
indirect and distortion costs, the benefits and the effectiveness of supervision, which are 
all quite difficult to conceptualise and measure.  It implies developing user-friendly and 
relevant indicators, benchmarks and rating systems. It means responding to the many 
analytical questions that were raised and could not find yet suitable answers. 
However, what is more important is that engaging in further work on the costs and 
benefits of regulation would enable us to contribute to the on-going discussions on 
regulatory adjustment and reform at the European level, as part of the current drive to-
wards EU reform and integration. A leap forward in fact is necessary in the approach to 
the discussion on regulation. The prevailing mode proceeds often through ping-ponging 
and emotional confrontations. Or it relies on ad-hoc, casual and episodic consultations. 
The latter is the case of the “call for evidence” launched by the European Commission in 
the autumn of 2015, which is nevertheless providing a unique and welcome opportunity 
to focus on the shortcomings of regulation and the most serious gaps to fill. 
This study has shown that we need on the contrary to develop a process of regular, 
structured and systematic research and development (R&D) initiatives, and to engage in 
an open dialogue and partnership with the relevant stakeholders. This process requires 
building a dedicated monitoring infrastructure with several key defining characteristics: 
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a) open to various sources of expertise; b) capable of mobilising the best minds and the 
centres of excellence in the field; c) pragmatic and hands-on in response to real ques-
tions and widely perceived needs; d) transparent in the dissemination of outcomes and 
achievements.
The monitoring system on the effectiveness of regulation should be based on four 
basic components: 1. Sound data and information; 2. Robust modelling techniques and 
analytical tools; 3. Customer orientation and a pragmatic problem solving approach; 4. 
Accountability of activities and outcomes;  5. Dialogue and partnership; 6. Integrity, 
scientific independence and neutrality. 
The system might also include a case by case collection of claims, grievances and 
complaints. It would amount then to a kind of Ombudsman, who stands by the side of 
all those that are burdened by over-detailed, bureaucratic and ineffective regulation. But 
it should also collect success stories and best practise, promote exchange of experience, 
cross-fertilisation and knowledge. It should aim at public confidence and trust building 
among savers, investors, policy makers and the public opinion, and therefore invest in 
communication, customer relations and financial education of the public at large. 
Finally, the monitoring system should be appropriately funded. This is a matter 
that cannot be left to voluntarism and do-good intentions. Also in this field, owing 
particularly to its complexity and skill-intensity, “there is no free lunch”, as economists 
use to say.  
The Osservatorio sulla distribuzione finanziaria of the Italian Banking Insurance and 
Finance Federation, which has promoted this study, is fully committed to continue 
working on this issue and cooperating with all interested interlocutors. It intends to 
stimulate and pursue partnerships with its federated Associations, its stakeholders and 
the network of scientific institutions, think thanks and professionals, among which in 
primis CASMEF.
We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Prof. Di Giorgio of Luiss University 
and its team at CASMEF. We are also grateful to Bank of Italy, who commented on 
a previous version of this paper, in particular to Salvatore Rossi, Carmelo Barbagallo, 
Andrea Pilati, Massimo Libertucci and Valentina Miscia. Giovanna Giurgola Trazza has 
plaid a key role in helping the coordination of the project, supporting the network of 
associations of the Osservatorio, and maintaining links with the Authorities and the 
stakeholders. We also thank the participants at the Osservatorio, who contributed with 
comments and suggestions on previous draft of this study. Finally, we are grateful to 
Giovanna Marando of FeBAF for her assistance throughout the project and in the prep-
aration of this volume.  
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Financial regulation and supervision in Europe:  
emerging trends, costs and effectiveness

Introduction
Banking and financial markets tend to be inherently unstable if they are left free to 
function without any form of regulatory constraint and supervisory action. The ration-
ales and objectives of financial regulation and supervision are the preservation of the 
stability of individual firms – micro-financial stability – and the financial system as a 
whole – macro-financial stability; the protection of savers and investors, which is crucial 
in order to facilitate the channeling of resources from surplus entities to deficit entities, 
also through the mitigation of asymmetric information problems, with transparency 
and disclosure requirements; the efficient and competitive functioning of banking and 
financial markets.
In order to achieve these objectives, countries have adopted specific institutional 
arrangements, entrusting regulatory and supervisory authorities with the necessary pow-
ers and tools. The choice on the institutional structure of regulation and supervision 
changes across countries and over time: different architectures mirror different visions 
on the best approaches and strategies to achieve the desired goals. Over the last three 
decades, these structures have undergone a process of transformation in a large number 
of countries, driven by dramatic changes in the structure and functioning of financial 
markets, triggered or at a minimum facilitated by deregulation and cross-sector integra-
tion in the financial industry.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the main approaches to banking and financial 
regulation and supervision, with a focus on the institutional architectures and on their 
evolution over time in advanced countries, with a particular attention for Europe and the 
euro area. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which became op-
erational on November 4, 2014, is only the latest step of a 20-year long series of profound 
transformations of regulatory and supervisory institutional arrangements in European 
countries. Understanding the differences in the institutional structures is of paramount 
importance in order to get a comprehensive picture of financial regulation and supervi-
sion; and, it is a necessary condition to carry out meaningful comparisons between au-
thorities and across countries, including those on the costs and effectiveness of regulation 
and supervision that are the objects of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively.
Overall, the quality of financial regulation and supervision across main European 
countries has proven to be a key issue during the financial crisis. In order to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the institutional arrangements adopted in the countries 
examined here, we first run a cost-side analysis in Chapter 2 and we then study the ef-
fectiveness of supervisory agencies’ action in Chapter 3. Costs of financial regulation and 
supervision are as difficult to measure as important, especially due to the peculiar nature 
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of some of these costs: beyond the direct costs, which are relatively easy to measure 
and usually borne by supervised entities through fees, there are internal costs borne to 
comply with the regulations, that are extremely difficult to identify and quantify. The 
empirical evidence reported in Chapter 2 refers to the former. To our knowledge none of 
the prior studies has the scope of this research in terms of both the number of authorities 
and the length of the time horizon taken into account. 
Studying the effectiveness of financial supervision is crucial to fully evaluate the 
overall adequacy and sustainability of a financial supervision system. Differences in the 
effectiveness of supervisors’ activity can help to explain the differences in the impact 
of the crisis on countries with financial systems operating under the same set of global 
standards. There are many ways to measure the performance and effectiveness of finan-
cial supervisors’ action. Effectiveness indicators are generally classified as follows: effort 
and effect indicators, output and outcome indicators, hard and soft indicators. Chapter 
3 examines some output indicators, such as the number of inspections and investiga-
tions, referred to the securities markets agencies of Italy, France, Spain and UK. Though 
there is significant room for getting a more refined and comprehensive picture, our 
preliminary analysis casts some doubts about the presumed direct correlations between 
costs and benefits of supervision.
Chapter 1 
The new organizational structure of financial regulation  
and supervision in Europe
1.1 
institutional arrangements for banking and financial  
regulation and supervision
Academic and policy oriented debates have identified a number of possible institutional 
arrangements for banking and financial regulation and supervision. Before going into 
depth into these different approaches, it must be noted that, for simplicity’s sake, here-
inafter we will use the term regulation and supervision interchangeably and, unless oth-
erwise specified, to indicate both concepts: but it is crucial to remember that the two 
functions are different, even though typically regulators are also entrusted with super-
visory powers.1
The issue of the institutional arrangements for banking and financial supervision 
concerns the choice about what and how many authorities to involve in supervision, and 
how to allocate supervisory responsibilities, should different bodies be involved. These 
choices, in turn, are likely to depend on a variety of factors including the structure and 
functioning of the financial system, the desire to avoid excessive concentration of power 
or to reap costs saving for example through economies of scale and scope.
A first possible structure for financial supervision is based on a sectoral approach, 
entailing one supervisor for each of the three main segments of the financial markets, 
banking, securities and insurance: one supervisor is responsible for banking oversight, 
a different authority oversees the securities markets and a third body is entrusted with 
the supervision of the insurance sector (and pension funds – which however may also 
be overseen by another, different authority). The key benefit of this type of supervisory 
architecture is that each supervisor is specialized in the regulation and control of one spe-
cific sector: higher specialization might entail more efficiency and effectiveness and could 
eliminate room for overlap between the measures and actions of different authorities. 
The sectoral approach is likely to be particularly suitable where financial markets are 
segmented and there is no or low degree of integration across the different segments. If 
cross-sector integration is relevant, on the other hand, then specialized, “silos” authori-
ties might risk losing effectiveness, given that they focus on the nature of the entities 
1 As will be seen, the European Supervisory Authorities are a partial exception to this rule.
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they supervise, and not on the business in which financial firms engage. Furthermore, 
the choice of the sectoral approach requires to have in place at least three regulators, 
which entails some degree of segmentation and might increase the (direct) costs of regu-
lation and supervision: in fact, all three authorities would need to be separately funded 
and it is possible that the cumulative costs of the three supervisors turn out to be higher 
than the costs of integrated or single supervisors.
Typically, when a sectoral approach is chosen, the central bank is the body entrusted 
with bank supervision, while two separate authorities supervise securities and insurance 
sectors. However, some countries have adopted a sectoral but integrated model, where 
one authority is in charge of supervision of two financial market segments (e.g. banks 
and insurance) and another body is responsible for the other segment (e.g. the securities 
market). The choice on how to integrate sectoral supervisors is likely to be influenced by 
the synergies and interactions between sectors: for example, an integrated supervisor for 
banks and insurance firms might be more appropriate where the banking and insurance 
businesses are deeply integrated, for example with banks heavily involved in the insur-
ance business (bancassurance).
As we have previously observed, the choice of the supervisory architecture boils 
down to a choice on how to allocate the different objectives of financial regulation across 
different authorities: under the silos approach, each sectoral supervisor aims to ensure 
that all objectives – micro-financial stability, macro-financial stability, transparency, ef-
ficiency and competition – are achieved in the specific, supervised sector. An alternative 
strategy is to focus on each goal with a cross-sector perspective: this is the approach “by 
objectives”, entailing one authority responsible for stability, one authority for transpar-
ency and conduct of business, one authority for competition. All these objectives have to 
be achieved by each authority not with reference to one specific segment of the financial 
markets, but for the entire financial market and across all its segments and businesses. 
This type of institutional structure has been defined as a “three peaks” model (Di 
Giorgio and Di Noia 2001), in light of the three objectives assigned to three different 
authorities. If the goal of stability is divided into micro – and macro – financial stability, 
with two separate authorities, then this approach turns into a “four peaks” model. The 
approach by objectives appears particularly appropriate for financial markets with a sig-
nificant degree of cross-sector integration: if financial institutions engage in a wide range 
of financial activities, the sectoral approach is likely to lose much of its effectiveness and 
focusing on cross-sector goals appears to be a more reasonable choice.
If the model by objectives is adopted, the central bank may be entrusted with micro-
financial stability powers, beyond macro-financial stability (which is generally assigned 
to the central bank anyhow), while another authority different from the central bank 
may be responsible for transparency and conduct of business. A possible explanation of 
the involvement of central banks as the bodies responsible for micro-financial stability 
might be that central banks have traditionally exercised control powers over the bank-
ing sector, for which stability has always been an extremely important, if not the most 
important goal. Transparency and conduct of business, on the other hand, relies to a 
large extent on interpretation of rules, standards and codes of conduct, and thus tend 
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to be dominated by lawyers and require a different culture and expertise with respect 
to financial stability: this might help explain why in the three – or four – peaks model 
the authorities in charge of transparency is generally an independent authority different 
from the central bank. However, the model by objectives does not necessarily require 
that the central bank be the body entrusted with micro-financial stability: an authority 
different from the central bank might have the responsibility for micro-financial stabil-
ity, leaving the central bank just with broad macro-financial stability tasks.
A third model of financial supervision is the functional approach (Merton 1992, 
Oldfield and Santomero 1995), according to which functions are more stable than the 
intermediaries that perform them, and therefore regulation should focus on functions 
rather than institutions. These functions may include, among others, payments settle-
ment and clearing, risk management, diffusion of prices of financial products, inter-
sectoral transfer of financial and economic resources across space and over time, origi-
nation of securities, distribution and packaging of securities. Under this approach, one 
regulator should be set up for each of these functions, leading to a substantially higher 
number of authorities relative to other approaches. 
A benefit of the functional approach is that the same functions would be treated 
consistently – by the same regulator – regardless of the nature of the institution that 
performs them: firms would not be able to engage in regulatory arbitrage, i.e. carrying 
out a specific business through an entity which falls under the domain of the least strict 
supervisor. A drawback of the functional model is that the institutional structure would 
be even more fragmented than under a sectoral approach, and formidable coordina-
tion problems between authorities would be likely to arise. Furthermore, functions and 
activities do not fail, while institutions do: a further authority would be needed, along 
with functional regulators, to preserve stability (Padoa Schioppa 1988). The functional 
approach is certainly interesting from a theoretical point of view, but its implementa-
tion would be extremely complex: this probably explains why this model has not been 
particularly successful in practice. 
All the models that we have described so far adopt some form of decentralization 
and fragmentation, given that more than one authority is involved in financial super-
vision. However, institutional arrangements may also follow a centralized approach, 
whereby a single regulator is entrusted with regulation and supervision tasks over all 
segments of the financial markets – banking, insurance, securities – and for all the objec-
tives – e.g. stability and transparency (leaving aside competition, which may be assigned 
to a different authority with a broader industry coverage, not limited to the financial 
sector). The establishment of a single regulator might be particularly suitable vis-à-vis 
financial markets which are deeply integrated on a cross-sector basis: under this per-
spective, a single regulator should be better able to mirror the integrated structure and 
functioning of financial markets. Moreover, economies of scale and scope might create 
cost savings relative to a fragmented architecture involving more authorities (regardless 
of the model, e.g. by sector or by objective). Coordination problems between differ-
ent authorities would not arise and comprehensive monitoring and timely intervention 
could be facilitated. Furthermore, concentration of all powers under the same umbrella 
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is likely to remove the risks of gaps or overlaps in supervision and of regulatory arbitrage, 
which might be there when the supervisory architecture is fragmented. Single regulators 
are typically assigned supervisory responsibility on stability and transparency for the 
entire spectrum of financial firms and markets: the focus on stability is generally aimed 
to micro-prudential stability i.e. the stability of individual financial institutions. Macro-
financial stability, on the other hand, is generally left in the hands of the central bank. 
A specific issue concerning the institutional arrangements for supervision has long 
been at the center of the debate both in the academic literature and at the policy level: 
the role of the central bank in banking and financial supervision. The assignment of 
banking supervision to the central bank has traditionally coincided with the choice on 
the combination of monetary policy and banking supervision2: consequently, the debate 
on the desirability of central bank as a supervisor has to a large extent boiled down to the 
analysis of advantages and drawbacks of the concentration of the two functions under 
the same institutional umbrella. 
The choice to combine banking supervision and monetary policy is to a large extent 
path-dependent: the historical origins of central banks3 matter as well as banking and fi-
nancial crises, which generally play a key role in shaping a country’s overall institutional 
2 This issue is likely to be less relevant for euro area countries, where monetary policy responsibility has 
been transferred to the European Central Bank since the introduction of the euro as a single currency: 
national central banks have only retained an indirect role in monetary policy.
3 Hawkesby (2000) identified three central banking models:
 – the Bank of England model: established in 1694 as a private bank competing with other banks, it pro-
gressively developed supervisory skills due to repeated intervention to rescue the banking system, even 
though prudential supervision was formally assigned to the Bank of England only in 1979 (Banking 
Act), following the 1973-1974 secondary banks crisis (the Bank of England, however, lost supervisory 
powers in 1997, even though it retained responsibility for systemic stability):
 – the U.S. Federal Reserve System model: the Fed was established in 1913 with the primary objective of 
preventing banking crises, which had repeatedly hit the country in the 19th century and at the begin-
ning of the 20th century; monetary policy functions were assigned to the Fed only subsequently, in the 
1920s (previously, monetary policy had basically been determined by the Gold Standard mechanisms);
 – the Bundesbank model: the German central bank was established in 1957 and it was granted inde-
pendence in the management of monetary policy, with the objective of safeguarding the value of the 
currency and ensuring price stability. To prevent conflicts of interest, it didn’t receive explicit super-
visory functions, not to undermine the credibility of monetary policy (for example, through distor-
tion of inflation expectations). However, the lack of formal assignment to the Bundesbank of direct 
supervisory responsibilities does not imply that it is not indirectly involved in supervision. In fact, the 
German central bank was given the right to be consulted by the Federal Agency in charge of banking 
supervision, used to operationally participate to banking supervision and its consensus was compul-
sory for decisions that would produce consequences on monetary policy; moreover, the Bundesbank 
is involved in specific supervisory tasks also with the new single regulator structure. The Bundesbank 
model, with the central bank substantially and primarily responsible only for monetary policy, has 
represented the model for the European Central Bank, until the latter was entrusted with banking 
supervision in 2013. Moreover, even though the ECB has started to perform supervisory functions in 
November 2014, many national central banks – which are member of the European System of Central 
Banks – still have banking supervision powers and, rarely, supervisory functions also on non-bank 
financial sectors.
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structure for financial supervision. The main rationale to concentrate supervisory func-
tions at central banks is the possibility to reap informational synergies between micro-
prudential supervision and monetary policy: availability of information at the micro 
level might allow the central bank to achieve a better understanding of the monetary 
and macroeconomic context. A central bank not involved in micro-prudential oversight 
of banks might be less able to prevent and manage bank failures and systemic crises 
and also to perform effectively monetary policy functions. Vice versa, knowledge and 
expertise deriving from monetary policy, oversight of money markets and the payments 
system might be beneficial for supervisory activities. 
A concern about establishing an integrated financial supervisor outside the central 
bank is whether it will be able to cooperate effectively with the central bank during a cri-
sis. Crisis management requires rapid transmission and interpretation of information. In 
principle, interagency cooperation could ensure that information flows between agen-
cies as readily as within agencies. An interagency crisis management committee may not 
function as effectively as a single authority that have all powers and incentives to initiate 
actions. Moreover, the so-called fallacy of composition, i.e. the fact that micro stability 
does not ensure macro stability, is one of the most important factor that called for a re-
involvement of central banks in supervision after the 2008 global financial crisis, largely 
driven by the desire to bring both functions under the same umbrella and fix the previ-
ous misalignment in the allocation of micro – and macro-financial stability powers.4 
One of the most controversial issues is the potential conflict of interests stemming 
from the assignment of supervisory responsibilities to the central bank, due to the risk 
that monetary policy might be influenced by considerations about banking stability is-
sues, which might lead to a lax attitude in the management of monetary policy. Some 
empirical evidence of such risk was provided by Di Giorgio and Di Noia (1999). They 
found the inflation rate to be considerably higher, and also more volatile, in countries 
where the central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. They also note that 
“a general problem of inconsistent policy assignment can emerge, given that with just 
one policy instrument there are two objectives to control: a trade-off among monetary 
stability and micro-stability of financial intermediaries (in particular, banking inter-
mediaries) may exist and be difficult to tackle” (Di Giorgio and Di Noia 1999, pp. 
16-17). Monetary policy restrictions might exacerbate banks’ financial conditions and, 
ultimately, might hinder banks stability: as a result, if the central bank gives priority to 
the stability of the banking system, it is likely that no monetary restriction is adopted 
or even that an expansionary policy is preferred when a restriction is needed. Such be-
havior might also be determined by the asymmetric effects of supervisory performance: 
on the one hand, success of supervision generally pass unnoticed, while, on the other 
hand, authorities’ reputation and credibility may be dramatically hit by one or more, or 
systemic, bank failures. In turn, a lack or a loss of reputation and credibility caused by 
a highly visible failure in banking supervision may also seriously threaten the effective-
4 The 2007-2008 global financial crisis showed, however, that integrated regulators, both inside and 
outside the central bank, incurred in huge failures: thus the root of the problem does not seem to be 
exclusively in the dichotomy of the integrated regulator inside or outside the central bank.
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ness of monetary policy. As stressed by Goodhart (2000), success in micro-prudential 
supervision is usually confidential while “failures” receive considerable adverse publicity, 
even when they should be regarded as evidence that the micro-prudential supervisor is 
performing its job effectively. 
The degree of independence of the central bank also matters. More independent 
central banks are more insulated from political pressures and may thus be better able 
at keeping inflation lower. For this reason, the degree of independence of the central 
bank is often included among the control variables when estimating the impact of the 
supervisory role of central banks on the inflation rate (see, for example, Di Giorgio and 
Di Noia, 1999). Furthermore, Briault (1999, p. 28) noted that there might be a different 
cause-effect relationship, with the degree of independence of central banks having an 
impact on both the inflation rate and the combination of monetary policy and supervi-
sion: according to this view, the lower the degree of independence, the higher the prob-
ability that the two functions are combined and that the inflation rate is higher. The 
two latter variables would therefore be both dependent variables: independence would 
simultaneously determine both of them and there would not be a direct causation effect 
of combination of functions on the inflation rate. Consistently with this perspective, 
Goodhart e Shoenmaker (1995) noticed that the least independent central banks are the 
ones which perform both monetary policy and supervisory functions.
Generally, countries that have set up a single regulator have kept such authority 
separate from the central bank5: one of the rationales for this separation is to prevent an 
excessive concentration of power under the central bank umbrella. With a single regula-
tor in place, the central bank is thus likely not to be entrusted with micro-stability tasks, 
while retaining a broader responsibility for macro-financial stability. The 2008 global 
financial crisis, however, has dramatically challenged the choice of taking micro-stability 
out of the central bank, as we will see in the next paragraph.
1.2 
evolving trends in the structure of financial supervision
1.2.2 Pre-crisis dynamics 
The organizational structure of banking and financial regulation and supervision has 
undergone a deep transformation process over the last three decades. Banking and fi-
nancial markets have been profoundly transformed by deregulation, conglomeration 
and globalization, which have led to the birth and growth of larger, diversified and mul-
tinational financial institutions. Starting in the late 1980s, the institutional organization 
of supervision has evolved in many countries to mirror the evolution in the financial 
industry: an increasing number of countries abandoned the sectoral approach to finan-
5 With some exceptions: Ireland is one of them. On the trade-off between the single regulator model and 
the involvement of the central bank in supervision see Masciandaro (2004, 2007).
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cial oversight. Sectoral supervisors were progressively replaced by single regulators or 
integrated regulators either by objectives or by sector.6 
One of the key rationales behind this new approach – together with cost saving – 
was the blurring of the borders between the different segments of the financial market 
(De Luna Martìnez and Rose 2003): the growing idea was that cross-sector integra-
tion in the financial industry required a cross-sector, integrated approach to regulation 
and supervision. The establishment of the UK single regulator, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), in the late 1990s was a milestone that further strengthened the wave 
of change in the approach to the structure of financial supervision: many other EU 
countries (including Germany) followed the UK example, though it may be interest-
ing to recall that the United States didn’t and have continued to rely on a complex web 
of numerous federal and state regulators. The assignment of supervisory powers to a 
single regulator was often accompanied by a reduction of the central bank role in finan-
cial supervision (Eichengreen and Dincer, 2011): this choice was mainly driven by the 
perceived risk that the concentration under the same umbrella of monetary policy and 
(banking) supervision would produce distortions and jeopardize the former (consist-
ently with the empirical findings of Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 1999).
1.2.2 The structure of financial supervision after the crisis
At the EU level, immediately after the 2008 financial crisis, following the proposal 
presented in February 2009 by a group of experts chaired by Jacques de Larosière (de 
Larosière Group, 2009), the European Union introduced relevant changes to its archi-
tecture for financial supervision. A new EU body for macro-prudential supervision was 
created, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB); three micro-prudential supervisors 
were created, building up on the previous so-called Level Three (implementing guide-
lines) Committees, CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS, which became supervisory authorities 
and were named EBA (European Banking Authority), ESMA (European Securities and 
Markets Authority) and EIOPA (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Au-
thority). These new regulators were assigned a number of key tasks including the devel-
opment of a single rulebook for financial markets in the EU, a mediation role between 
different national authorities and a coordination role in emergency situations. The three 
authorities were designed on the basis of a sectoral approach, following the traditional 
tripartition of financial markets, even though the possibility of a review has already been 
envisaged. A reciprocal flow of information must be exchanged between ESRB and the 
ESAs (Figure 1.1). It should be stressed that the establishment of the ESAs has not been 
effective at reducing the burden and the activities to be carried out by national authori-
ties, and the related expected cost savings have not been reaped to date.
6 See Taylor (1995) on the “twin peaks” model; see Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2001) for a proposal of a 
four-peak model for the euro area. On the rise of single and integrated supervisors see Herring and 
Carmassi (2008). Other supervisory models, such as the model by functions and the model by objec-
tives, while presenting interesting features from a theoretical perspective, have been scarcely imple-
mented; see Merton (1992) and Di Noia and Piatti (1998).
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Figure 1.1 – ESRB and ESAs
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanisms (SSM) at the Eurozone/EU level, 
which became operational on November 4, 2014, has dramatically innovated the approach 
and structure of banking supervision in light of the new role of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) as the direct supervisor of the largest and systemic banking groups in Europe: about 
130 European banking groups, accounting for circa 85% of total assets, have fallen under 
the supervisory umbrella of the ECB.7 Supervisory tasks are carried out by the Supervisory 
Board, a new internal body of the ECB, which is separated from the ECB Governing Coun-
cil and thus from the monetary policy arm in order to minimize potential conflicts between 
objectives. National supervisors will retain direct supervisory powers on all other banks, but 
with regard to these banks the ECB shall issue regulations, guidelines and instructions to 
national supervisors; can intervene directly where necessary to ensure high supervisory stand-
ards; can request information and conduct investigations and inspections.
Therefore, the SSM is a network of supervisors, entailing an allocation and sharing 
of responsibilities between the ECB and national supervisors. The new system is thus 
likely to be more complex and articulated, also because at the national level different 
supervisory structures are still in place across EU countries: in some countries a sectoral 
7 The ECB is entrusted with direct supervision of systemic banks, defined as those: i) with total assets 
exceeding € 30 billion; ii) with total assets exceeding 20% of national GDP (unless total assets are 
below € 5 billion); iii) being among the three most significant credit institutions in a member state; 
iv) identified by the ECB as significant either following notification by national supervisors or on its 
own initiative having regard to cross-border relevance; v) having requested or received public financial 
assistance directly from the EFSF/ESM.
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approach remains (e.g. Spain, Greece, Portugal); in others, one supervisor is in charge 
of preserving financial stability, while a separate body oversees conduct of business and 
must ensure transparency (e.g. Netherlands and, to a large extent, Italy); some countries 
still rely on a single regulator (e.g. Germany and Ireland).8 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the organizational structure of financial supervi-
sion in selected advanced countries and illustrates, at least in part, the overall complexity 
of the current architectures. It should be noted that supervisory institutional arrange-
ments do not always perfectly mirror a specific theoretical model: hybrid solutions may 
be identified, combining elements of different models. For example, France has adopted 
a model by objective, with the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR) 
in charge of stability and the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) in charge of trans-
parency and investor protection. But the ACPR performs its functions with regard to 
banks and insurance firms, and it ensures investor protection for the clients of these 
firms: clearly, the approach by sector and the approach by objective are mixed. In Italy, 
the dominant approach is based on objectives, but two sectoral authorities oversee the 
insurance and pension funds sectors (Ivass and Covip, respectively). 
A further element of complexity is related to the scope of application of the SSM 
(and, more broadly, of the banking union project), since all euro area countries will 
participate to SSM, while EU non-euro countries may join on a voluntary basis through 
‘close cooperation’ agreements with the ECB, but may also choose to stay out (as already 
done by the United Kingdom). However, vis-à-vis this fragmentation related to supervi-
sion, regulatory functions at EU level have been assigned to the EBA for all EU member 
states, thus creating a complex and interesting asymmetry and geographical mismatch 
between regulation and supervision.
1.2.3 The new role of central banks in financial supervision after the crisis
The 2008 financial crisis exposed pitfalls and shortcomings of the supervisory institutional 
arrangements that emerged after the first wave of reforms. In particular, the evident failure 
of the single regulator model led to a new wave of changes in the organizational struc-
ture of financial supervision. In the United Kingdom, the FSA was closed and micro-
prudential supervisory functions have been taken up in 2013 by a new Prudential Regula-
tion Authority (PRA) established within the Bank of England, while conduct of business 
tasks have been assigned to a new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), separate from the 
central bank; finally, a Financial Policy Committee (FPC) has been created within the 
Bank of England and entrusted with the preservation of macro-financial stability. The at-
tractiveness of the single regulator model has significantly decreased and, generally, central 
8 The picture is even more complex where, as in Italy, recently created micro-authorities complement func-
tions performed by the primary supervisors – and sometimes their tasks may overlap. Their powers may 
include the exercise of significant supervisory and disciplinary powers, keeping registers and verifying the 
fairness and transparency of their members’ conduct. In turn, they may be subject to the oversight by the 
primary supervisors. However, their involvement in supervision is heterogeneous: some of these bodies 
have limited supervisory functions, while others may be fully considered supervisors.
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Table 1.1 – The structure of financial supervision in Europe, as of March 2015
 
Systemically  
Important Banks
Banks Securities Insurance
Central bank 
with primary 
responsibility for 
micro-prudential 
supervision?
Austria ECB U/CB U U yes*
Belgium ECB CB (P) / C yes
Bulgaria   CB SI yes
Croatia   CB SI yes
Cyprus ECB CB S I (G) yes
Czech  
Republic   CB CB CB yes
Denmark   U no
Estonia ECB U no
Finland ECB U no
France ECB P/C (CB) - BI C - S
P/C (CB) 
- BI yes
Germany ECB U yes*
Greece ECB CB SI CB yes
Hungary   CB CB CB yes
Ireland ECB CB CB CB yes
Italy ECB P (CB) - C - I yes
Latvia ECB CB CB CB no
Lithuania ECB CB CB CB yes
Luxembourg ECB BS BS I no
Malta ECB U no
Netherlands ECB CB (P) / C yes
Poland   U no
Portugal ECB CB CB/S I yes
Romania   CB SI yes
Slovakia ECB CB CB CB yes
Slovenia ECB CB S I yes
Spain ECB CB S I (G) yes
Sweden   U no
United King-
dom   P (CB) / C yes
EU/euro area ECB EBA/ECB ESMA EIOPA yes
* Some specific supervisory functions, e.g. setting regulatory framework, monitoring books, conducting 
inspections. 
Source: authorities’ websites. B=banks, I=insurance, S=securities, P=prudential, C=conduct of business, 
CB=central banks, G=government, BI,SI,BS=integrated by sector, U = single regulator.
33
banks have now been entrusted with crucial regulatory and supervisory powers9: this is 
true for the Bank of England and the ECB in Europe, as well as for the Federal Reserve in 
the United States.10 Among the main drivers of this change, the need to bring under the 
same umbrella micro – and macro – supervision has certainly played a key role, since the 
crisis had highlighted the so-called “fallacy of composition”, i.e. micro-stability does not 
necessarily ensure macro-financial stability: having both functions performed by the same 
authority has now been regarded as a superior option to achieve both goals.
Therefore, while the first wave of reforms had significantly weakened the role of central 
banks in micro-prudential financial supervision, the trend has been reversed after the 2008 
global financial crisis, both at the euro area level, with the new role of the ECB within the 
SSM, and in some countries. Figure 1.2 shows the number of European countries where the 
central bank has primary responsibility for micro-prudential supervision, along with a break-
down of the supervisory models. In the EU-28, in 20 countries the central bank is entrusted 
with primary supervision responsibility, whereas within the euro area in 14 out of 19 euro area 
countries the central bank is entrusted with micro-prudential supervisory powers.
Figure 1.2 –The structure of financial supervision in EU-28 Member States (number of countries, 2015)
* Number does not include non-euro countries that will participate to SSM on a voluntary basis through 
close cooperation agreements with the ECB.
9 For a recent study on financial crises and the role of central banks in supervision see Masciandaro 
and Romelli (2015).
10 The Federal Reserve was already entrusted with banking supervision tasks, but post-crisis financial 
reforms strengthened and expanded such powers, including pervasive supervisory powers on 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) – banking groups with at least $ 50 billion of 
consolidated total assets and non-bank financial institutions labeled as systemic by the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council. The Fed is also entrusted with early remediation powers on SIFIs 
(e.g. request of recapitalization, limits to asset growth, removal of management) and may apply 
risk mitigation measures (e.g. limits to M&A, business restrictions and even break-up); together 
with the FDIC, the Fed receives and evaluates resolution plans submitted by SIFIs and may request 
changes; if not satisfied, the Fed may impose stronger requirements or even breaking-up groups.
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It is evident that central banks have a key and increasing role in banking and financial 
supervision. Some questions arise: should the central bank involvement in supervision 
be regarded as a positive and effective institutional arrangement? Or is it preferable to 
house banking and financial supervision outside the central bank? As extensively dis-
cussed in the literature and confirmed by the 2008 financial crisis, like there is no con-
sensus on an optimal structure of financial supervision, the involvement of the central 
bank in micro-prudential banking and financial supervision has also both pros and cons 
(Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995; Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 1999; Goodhart, 2000; 
Padoa Schioppa, 2003). For example, on the one hand, the combination of macro and 
micro stability functions at the central bank might help to better achieve both goals and 
the involvement of central bank in supervision might facilitate crisis management and 
resolution; on the other hand, potential conflicts between price stability and financial 
stability might arise, as well as risks of excessive concentration of power and the risk of 
an implicit extension of the safety net to non-bank financial institutions if these latter 
are also supervised by the central bank, with moral hazard implications.11
All in all, it may prove hard to determine whether the potential benefits outweigh 
the potential risks: the new stronger role of central banks in micro-prudential supervi-
sion is probably a rational response to the pitfalls of pre-crisis institutional arrange-
ments, but it does not imply that risks have disappeared. While the objective of financial 
stability has been a key factor behind the new stronger role of central banks in supervi-
sion, it remains to be seen what might be the implications of the new arrangements for 
bank crises management and financial stability, as well as on a number of other mac-
roeconomic variables (e.g. inflation) and the structure, functioning and profitability of 
the banking system. With regard to the SSM, the separation within the ECB between 
the Supervisory Board and the monetary policy arm aims to eliminating or minimizing 
the potential conflicts between their different objectives. Nevertheless, only time will 
tell whether such separation will be effective or if one of the two functions will produce 
distortions or even jeopardize the exercise of the other.
1.2.4 Some concluding remarks
More broadly, and quite apart from the issue of the central bank involvement in banking 
supervision, the 2008 global financial crisis showed that no model of financial supervi-
sion was able to perform better than the others: in other words, the key lesson was that 
no optimal structure of financial supervision exists. The systemic crisis hit banks and fi-
nancial markets regardless of the institutional arrangements for financial regulation and 
supervision: it certainly hit the United Kingdom, the country that had had a leading role 
in the shift to the single regulator model; it hit countries where supervision was organ-
ized with a sectoral approach; it hit countries with a model of supervision by objectives; 
11 The rescue of large non-depository financial institutions (the insurance group AIG and the investment 
bank Bear Stearns) by the Federal Reserve in the 2008 crisis represents a clear example of the extension 
of the safety net and its potentially dangerous implications.
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it hit countries where the central bank was in charge of supervision as well as countries 
where the central bank lacked oversight powers.
In particular, looking at post crisis reforms, the two main lessons drawn from policy-
makers seem to be that: 1) the single regulator model is not necessarily the best model; 
and 2) splitting micro and macro-prudential supervision might be a risky choice, and 
the two functions should be combined under the central bank umbrella. As a conse-
quence, some countries (e.g. UK and Belgium) have abandoned the single regulator 
model and reverted to the central bank as the key authority for banking and financial 
regulation and supervision. But the single regulator is still in place in other countries, 
like Germany, and in general changes in the institutional arrangements for supervision 
have been uneven and heterogeneous across countries, leading to a complex web of dif-
ferent national supervisory architectures. 
On top of the complexity of national arrangements, the new European layers of 
regulation and supervision are likely to make the overall framework even more complex. 
The approach and the institutional choices on the creation of a EU level of regulation 
and supervision have been different and, to some extent, conflicting: regulatory func-
tions on all financial market segments (banks, markets, insurance and pension funds) 
have been assigned to the three ESAs, set up with a sectoral approach, while supervision 
has been entrusted to the ECB, within the SSM, but just for banks and with a focus on 
stability. Moreover, ESMA is also entrusted with supervision of credit rating agencies 
and trade repositories, adding complexity to institutional arrangements; and, as recalled, 
EBA is responsible for the single rulebook for all EU countries, while supervision will 
have a narrower geographic scope only including SSM countries. The assignment to the 
ECB of banking supervisory powers on stability could not only create room for conflicts 
between different ECB objectives, but it might also make it more difficult to deal with 
potential conflicts between stability (ECB) and transparency (ESMA), leading to pos-
sible inter-agency conflicts. 
The 2014 review of the ESAs and the European System of Financial Supervision 
carried out by the European Commission has been very prudent on possible changes to 
institutional structures: the report mentioned the possibility of moving to a “twin peaks” 
or a single regulator model and the need to take into account the banking union devel-
opment, but it fell short of proposing significant changes in the near term, announcing 
further analysis of the issue with a medium to long term perspective (European Com-
mission 2014a, 2014b). In light of the excessive complexity of current arrangements, the 
2014 might be considered as a missed opportunity to rationalize the system and make it 
simpler, more consistent and more effective.
Finally, the establishment of a banking union might create a further asymmetry, in 
absence of a broader and more structured financial union. There is a need to rationalize 
and simplify the legislative framework on financial markets, possibly concentrating all 
rules in a single rulebook for financial markets in the EU: the current legislative regime 
is excessively complex and formal compliance with such rules is likely to be excessively 
burdensome for the financial industry, with a potential to jeopardize compliance with 
rules from a substantial point of view. Also, supervision should be centralized at the Eu-
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ropean level, as it has been done for the banking sector, eliminating or minimizing the 
room for divergent supervisory practices, which currently prevent from the creation of 
a level playing field and may be exploited to reap competitive advantages.12 The capital 
markets union project recently launched by the European Commission (2015) might 
play a crucial role in this domain.13 Though rules disciplining the markets for financial 
instruments are common to all European countries, financial supervision is still run 
based on national, and to some extent different, level. Differences among European 
countries in the development of financial markets, in their financial culture and tradi-
tions, as well as, the ESMA’s limited enforcement power provide tremendous obstacles 
to the centralization process of financial markets supervision. Having a strong European 
authority in charge of regulation and supervision is essential to actually harmonize su-
pervisory practices and benefit from a concrete institutional simplification.
The complexity of the institutional structures of financial supervision is likely to be 
particularly burdensome for large European and global cross-border banking and finan-
cial groups, which are obliged to deal with a huge number of supervisors in the multiple 
jurisdictions where they operate: supervisory fragmentation is thus likely to produce a 
cost for financial institutions. The introduction of new set of rules will make even more 
difficult the competitive scenario for many financial intermediaries in Europe. In fact, 
the new revisions of MiFID and IMD directives, as well as the PRIIPs regulation, are 
expected to set out a wide range of issues and significant changes in market participants’ 
behavior and in their responsibilities. MiFID II and IMD2 touch many operational 
areas of financial intermediaries and insurance companies. In particular, new rules in 
terms of inducements, conflicts of interests, increased disclosure and transparency, re-
muneration policies will generate overall new compliance costs, especially for those in-
termediaries providing complex products and services. These changes will inevitably call 
for a revision in the current supervision and compliance systems. Thus, the structure of 
financial supervision must be taken into account when trying to estimate and evaluate 
the costs and benefits of financial regulation and supervision, which is what we will do 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this research.
12 For a proposal along these lines see Consob (2014), where the twin-peaks model is proposed as the 
benchmark for the reform of the European institutional arrangements on financial supervision. How-
ever, as recalled, the European Commission has not taken a strong position in this regard in his 2014 
report on the review of the European System of Financial Supervision.
13 The key objectives of capital markets union are the following: i) improve access to finance for all busi-
nesses and infrastructure projects across Europe; ii) help SMEs raise finance as easily as large compa-
nies; iii) create a single market for capital by removing barrier to cross-border investments; iv) diversify 
the funding of the economy and reduce the cost of raising capital.
Chapter 2 
The costs of financial supervision
2.1  
the costs of financial regulation and supervision
The costs of financial regulation and supervision are as difficult to assess as important. 
According to Franks et al. (1997), there are three main difficulties in defining these costs. 
First, direct costs associated with the functioning of the regulatory agencies represent 
only a part of the total cost of regulation. Beyond direct costs there are internal costs 
borne to comply with the regulations, as we will discuss. Second, neither the direct nor 
the compliance costs are necessarily fully incremental, as they do not take into account 
the costs which would be incurred by the industry in the absence of regulation.1 Third, 
in assessing the regulatory burden, we might wish to distinguish between transfer pay-
ments between parties, such as compensation payments, and the dead-costs represented 
by the amount of resources used in running regulatory agencies, in order to give them 
a different weight.
The first, necessary step to carry out an analysis is to define the costs of regulation, 
that can be classified as follows2:
1. direct costs, i.e. costs which are borne by authorities, the financial industry and the 
state or society as a whole to allow the effective performance of the regulatory and 
supervisory activity in its various forms, from rules production to enforcement. In 
line with Schuler and Heinemann (2005), our empirical evidence will show that 
these costs are usually borne by the regulated industry through fees which often 
cover almost entirely the supervisory authority’s budget;
2. indirect or incremental costs, which are paid by supervised entities to comply with 
regulatory requirements. These costs may be regarded as incremental relative to an 
alternative scenario without regulation and without regulators. Such incremental 
costs include both the costs borne by the supervised entities to comply with the 
1 For example, suppose securities firms must, under current regulations, maintain minimum capital re-
quirements based on the size and riskiness of their positions. Since good managers would control the 
relation between the size of their firms’ positions and their capital, not all the costs associated with capital 
requirements should be regarded as incremental. On the other hand, regulation may partially substitute 
for a firm’s monitoring of counterparty risk which the firm would carry out in the absence of regulation. 
2 Here we will follow the taxonomy proposed by Briault (2003).
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rules – compliance costs – and the costs to inform authorities that the regulatory 
requirements have been met – information costs. Direct costs are generally shifted to 
a large extent to the industry through the imposition of supervisory fees: therefore, 
direct costs are a component of compliance costs. A specific type of incremental 
costs is related to profits that a firm foregoes because it must use the resources that 
it would have invested in the profitable project to comply with regulatory require-
ments. Franks et al. (1997) have estimated a 4:1 ratio between the incremental costs 
and the direct costs. Another example of incremental costs is that of higher capital 
requirements imposed on the banking industry to better preserve micro and macro-
financial stability: the debate on the costs of stricter rules and on the potential ben-
efits in terms of a higher degree of stability, on one side, and the possible negative 
effects on credit for households and firms, on the other side, effectively shows the 
difficulty of measuring these costs, and especially of finding a consensus on the 
quantitative impact;3
3. distortion costs, stemming from the potential distortions created by regulation: they 
might, for example, discourage firms from entering a specific market that they 
would have entered in the absence of regulation and regulators. In general, these 
costs relate to the potential distortive effects on markets structure and products – 
and even on their existence. Clearly, if regulation is well designed, such distortion 
costs should be more than compensated by the benefits brought by regulation.
Goodhart (1988) proposed a wider taxonomy of regulation costs, identifying the follow-
ing five types: 1) the direct resources costs of the regulatory system – people, equipment 
and buildings – which could have been used for other purposes; 2) costs that may fall on 
supervised entities in order to finance the supervisor; 3) the possibility that additional 
resources, for example, of skilled labour, might have been attracted to work in relatively 
high value-added activities, but have been discouraged by the additional burden of the 
regulatory system; 4) the possibility that regulation may lessen competition, raise costs 
and lead to static inefficiency; 5) the risk that regulation may hinder innovation in finan-
cial intermediation, leading to dynamic inefficiency. It should be noted that the third, 
fourth and fifth type of costs may all fall under the distortion costs category mentioned 
above.
Schüler and Heinemann (2005) have also provided a similar classification of the 
costs of financial supervision identifying the following three categories of costs: institu-
tional costs (direct costs), costs of compliance and structural cost. Their graphical repre-
sentation (reported in Figure 2.1) shows how institutional/direct costs are shifted to the 
industry and thus can be interpreted both as direct costs and as a relevant component 
of compliance costs. Their structural costs category refers to the impact on products and 
markets produced by regulation and substantially corresponds to the previously defined 
distortion costs.
Schüler and Heinemann (2005) focused on the cost of fragmentation of the insti-
tutional architecture of financial supervision, with a particular attention for the cost 
3 On the costs of financial regulation see, for example, Elliott et al. (2012).
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saving potential from a reform of the European supervisory system towards a more effi-
cient framework. Multiple supervisors might increase costs for the industry, for example 
because firms have to pay fees to more authorities; because institutions should talk to 
many authorities, both at the national and international level, posing formidable chal-
lenges for both firms and regulators; or because they would have to comply with many 
different sets of reporting requirements with different content and format, which is 
likely to substantially increase compliance costs. Fragmentation costs should be analyzed 
in conjunction with the potential benefits of a fragmented structure of financial supervi-
sion in order to evaluate whether and to what extent such costs are compensated – or 
not – by benefits (e.g. higher sectoral specialization of supervisors facilitating dialogue 
with supervised entities).
Figure 2.1 – The costs of financial supervision
Source: Schüler and Heinemann (2005).
The computation of the direct costs of regulation and supervision appears relatively easy: 
data on costs borne by supervisors are generally publicly available (with some excep-
tions), as well as their revenues; and so are the fees levied on the industry and the State 
contribution, where present. On the other hand, calculating incremental costs (except 
supervisory fees) and distortion costs presents formidable challenges. Studies on these 
costs typically rely on surveys submitted to representative samples of supervised entities: 
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in these surveys, firms are asked to describe what choices, behavior and operating strate-
gies they had to adopt in response to the requirements imposed by regulation. Surveys 
offer homogeneous and comparable results. However, it may be hard for the firms to 
exactly identify what their choices and strategies would have been in absence of regula-
tion: in fact, firms should make assumptions not only and not simply on their hypo-
thetical alternative behavior, but also on the potential alternative choices of other firms 
in absence of regulation. Absence of regulation would probably significantly change the 
structure, functioning and dynamics of the market. Since it would be extremely com-
plex for firms to make assumptions on other firms’ choices in the absence of regulation, 
their answers will be biased: they will respond based on a scenario where they are not 
subject to regulation but other firms are. Based on Franks et al. (1997), estimates of the 
incremental costs of regulation are augmented by the fact that while firms can imagine 
an environment where they are not regulated, it appears far more difficult for them to 
conceive a totally unregulated industry. 
Another possible methodology to estimate incremental costs likely to be produced 
by a new rule is to look back at the effects of similar regulatory measures introduced in 
the past, or in other countries. Therefore, this approach requires a benchmark too, i.e. 
that the incremental costs have already been estimated once, and does not solve entirely 
the problem.
Alfon and Andrews (1999) emphasized the complexity related to the estimation of 
incremental costs as well, observing that they depend on views about choices and activi-
ties that would be undertaken in the absence of regulation. They also pointed out that, 
even for an individual regulatory measure, it would be hard to obtain a single vision on 
its impact, which is going to be different for different firms.
While the effects of incremental and distortion costs are crucial, our study aims to 
provide a detailed overview of direct costs, and the portion of compliance costs corre-
sponding to direct costs. Even though direct costs are not an exhaustive measure of the 
costs of regulation and supervision, their analysis is a necessary starting point. Moreover, to 
our knowledge few studies have been developed on the direct costs of supervision to date4, 
even though their estimation is relatively easier than for the other classes of costs, and none 
of them has the scope of this research. Our empirical analysis aims to provide estimates 
for the direct costs of supervision both with cross-section (different authorities in different 
countries) and time series data (2004-2013, when data are available for the entire period).
2.2  
an empirical analysis of the direct costs of financial supervision
2.2.1 Some preliminary caveats
Our empirical analysis is focused on the direct costs of supervision, which can provide 
extremely useful information both on the expenses of supervisors and on the burden 
on supervised entities: in fact, in most cases, authorities are almost entirely funded by 
4 See, for example, Carmassi (2004) and Schüler and Heinemann (2005). 
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industry contributions. The prevailing role of the market funding mechanism relative to 
the public funding approach reflects the dominant view that the industry should pay the 
costs of supervisors because supervised entities are liable to produce negative externali-
ties on the financial markets, and on the economy as a whole: they should be called to 
pay a “price” in order to prevent such externalities and internalize their costs through 
supervisory fees. In recent years even supervisors which used to rely to a large extent on 
public funding progressively shifted to a funding mechanism based on industry fees and 
without a state contribution.
Therefore, the costs borne by authorities are costs for the industry, and their analy-
sis is crucial in order to understand and evaluate the impact of the supervisory actions 
on the industry. As discussed in paragraph 2.1., this impact only catches a direct and 
monetary effect, and many indirect implications should be also taken into account. 
Nonetheless, the study of direct costs is a necessary step. 
Another caveat is that information obtained through the analysis of direct costs 
must be interpreted very carefully, for a number of reasons. The first one is that higher 
or lower costs do not necessarily mean lower or higher efficiency: costs level is likely to 
depend on a wide range of factors, starting from the size of the supervised entities and 
markets, and cannot be automatically read as an indicator of supervisory “efficiency”. 
Second, when comparing costs of different supervisors, it must be kept in mind 
that different supervisors often have different tasks and a different scope of activities: for 
example, the costs of a sectoral supervisor cannot and should not be compared with the 
costs of a single regulator as if they were performing the same functions.
Third, the analysis of direct costs does not make it possible to disentangle in a sys-
tematic way for all authorities the costs related to regulatory tasks from those related to 
supervisory activities. Disentangling these two types of direct costs would be particularly 
useful, but to our knowledge it is not a feasible task, also because a clear breakdown 
of staff figures between staff involved in regulation and staff involved in supervision is 
not made available in a systematic and homogeneous way across authorities and across 
countries. For simplicity, we will generally refer to the costs of supervision, but we are 
aware of the potential overlap between costs of supervision and costs of regulation.5
Fourth, the costs of supervision are only one side of the coin and should be analyzed 
in conjunction with benefits: for example, a supervisor with higher costs might be more 
efficient and better able to achieve its goals than a “cheaper” authority, so one should 
be extremely careful when trying to infer information on efficiency from data on costs.
2.2.2 Heterogeneity of supervisory structures across our sample countries
Taking into account all these caveats, we can now move to the analysis of the direct costs 
of a group of selected financial supervisors in some of the largest European countries: we 
will focus on Italy, Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. We will also in-
5 This problem is less relevant for the three European Supervisory Authorities, whose activities are largely 
focused on regulation, with the partial exception of ESMA supervision of credit rating agencies and 
trade repositories.
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clude in the data analysis the three European Supervisory Authorities, EBA, ESMA and 
EIOPA: in this regard, a further fundamental caveat is that they mostly perform regula-
tory rather than supervisory functions, with the partial exceptions of ESMA. Finally, we 
will also discuss some data regarding the so-called “micro-authorities”.
Before going into depth into data analysis, it is of essence to recall that supervisory 
structures are significantly different across the countries on which we have chosen to 
focus. In Italy, the supervisory structure is largely based on an approach by objective, 
whereby Consob is responsible for transparency and conduct of business and the Bank 
of Italy is in charge of preserving stability. However sectoral features remain: Ivass, an 
internal body of the Bank of Italy that in 2013 took the place of the former independent 
insurance regulator, Isvap, supervises the insurance sector, and Covip oversees the pen-
sion funds industry. Therefore, despite a shift in recent years towards a model by objec-
tive, the sectoral approach has not disappeared yet, even though it has been significantly 
weakened.
In Germany, BaFin was established in 2002, during the first wave of post-FSA re-
forms, and incorporated three previous supervisors organized on the basis of a sectoral 
approach. Its internal structure still mirrors the former sectoral separation, with inter-
nal departments for banking, securities and insurance business; but BaFin is a single 
regulator, meaning that it is responsible for the oversight of the entire financial market. 
BaFin is an independent authority and the central bank, the Bundesbank, only carries 
out some specific supervisory functions. The post-crisis wave of reforms of supervisory 
architecture has not produced a change in the German model, at least to date, so that 
the single regulator is still in place, unlike in other European countries such as Belgium 
and the United Kingdom.
France has significantly simplified its supervisory architecture over the last ten years. 
It moved from a complex system with multiple authorities to a mixed model by objec-
tive and by sector where the ACPR is responsible for stability (including resolution 
tasks) and the AMF is in charge of transparency and conduct of business; but the ACPR 
must ensure stability and investor protection for the banking and insurance business, 
thus following a sectoral (integrated) approach. The ACPR is housed within the central 
bank, the Banque de France, and was formed in 2013 through the assignment of reso-
lution powers to the ACP: the ACP had been established in 2010 through the merger 
of three authorities (two on insurance and one on banking), with the responsibility of 
prudential supervision and stability. 
In the United Kingdom a single regulator separate from the central bank, the Finan-
cial Services Authority, had been established in the late 1990s: after the 2008 financial 
crisis, the FSA has been abolished and its functions split and assigned to two new dif-
ferent authorities. Since 2013 a new body set up as a subsidiary of the Bank of England, 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), is responsible for prudential regulation and 
stability of individual financial firms, with a cross-sector approach. The transparency 
and conduct of business powers have been taken up by the new Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). 
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In Spain, a sectoral approach is followed: the central bank supervises the banking 
sector, the CNMV oversees the securities markets and the Dirección General de Seguros 
y Fondos de Pensiones (within the Ministry of Economy) oversees the insurance sector 
as well as pension funds. 
At the European level, the three ESAs have been designed on the basis of a sectoral 
approach: EBA for the banking sector, ESMA for securities markets and EIOPA for 
insurance and pension funds.6 With the exceptions of supervisory powers of ESMA on 
credit rating agencies and trade repositories, the three ESAs are entrusted with regula-
tory powers, not with supervision functions. However, with the start of the Single Su-
pervisory Mechanism in November 2014, the ECB is responsible for banking oversight, 
with direct supervision powers on the largest euro area banks and indirect supervision of 
other banks. The costs for the supervisory tasks performed by the ECB will be covered 
by fees levied on credit institutions.7
This overview of the institutional arrangements for financial supervision in different 
countries suggests that the comparison of revenues and costs should be prudent and that 
different scope of activities as well as the different size of the overseen industry must be 
taken into account. Also, it should be noted that, while in general financial statements 
of supervisors other than central banks are readily available, disentangling supervision 
data from the financial statements of a central bank may prove hard, if possible at all. 
For this reason, we have been able to estimate some figures for the Bank of Italy (but not 
a complete time series), and we have not been able to collect data for the Bank of Spain. 
The situation is different when the central bank performs supervisory functions through 
an authority set up under its umbrella, in which case financial accounts of the authority 
are generally available.
2.2.3 Evidence on direct costs of financial supervision
Turning to data analysis, it is clear that the size of different authorities is highly heteroge-
neous. We measure the size of supervisors through revenues and costs (Figure 2.2). The 
two measures are often extremely close: costs are paid mostly with fees raised on super-
vised entities, and such fees are determined so as to cover supervisors’ costs. Some au-
thorities obtain quite large surplus, and this surplus may be accounted among revenues 
for the following year: in our data analysis, we have chosen not to include this number 
in total revenues of authorities, in order to be able to focus only on the revenues of each 
year corresponding to the costs borne. Figure 2.2 indicates that the size of UK authori-
ties is by far the largest, both with the now abolished FSA and with the new regulators 
by objectives, PRA and FCA. The Bank of Italy follows, while BaFin and ACPR are half 
6 The focus of this study is on micro-prudential regulation and supervision authorities: for this reason, 
the analysis does not include the European Systemic Risk Board, which is entrusted with a macro-
prudential supervision mission.
7 See Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 establishing the SSM; and Regulation (EU) No 
1163/2014 of the European Central Bank of 22 October 2014 on supervisory fees (ECB/2014/41).
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as big as the Bank of Italy supervisory division in terms of costs of supervisory activities. 
All other authorities are much smaller.
Figure 2.2 – Size of supervisors, revenues and expenses 2013 (mln euro)*
* The figure on revenues of the Bank of Italy for supervisory activities is estimated and made equal to the 
reported figure on the cost of supervisory activities. 
Source: supervisors’ data.
Looking at time series for each supervisor (see the figures included in the Appendix to 
this Chapter), an increasing trend may be generally observed over time: in some cases 
(e.g. FSA and BaFin), the size of supervisors has significantly increased after the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis, probably signaling an increase in the efforts and in the economic resources 
committed to financial regulation and supervision after the recent failures. The same 
indication comes from the data on the number of workers of supervisors, as we will see.
The second area of interest concerns the sources of funding: for most authorities, a 
percentage higher than 90% and often very close to 100% of total revenues comes from 
fees levied on supervised entities. Little role is played, in our sample of supervisors, by 
the State contribution: it was a relevant share of the funding for Consob and Covip in 
the past, but it has now been eliminated. The dominance of the funding through fees 
levied on the supervised entities turns the issue of expenses of supervisors into an issue 
of costs for the industry.
The funding mechanisms of supervisors have been extensively debated.8 On the 
one hand, the state might be called to pay the bill because authorities pursue objectives 
8 For a cross-country analysis of funding mechanisms of supervisors see Masciandaro et al. (2007). For 
a study on the financing of independent authorities, including non-financial authorities, see Assonime 
(2011).
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which are of public interest, such as a financial stability, transparency and the protec-
tion of investors and savers. But a key role of the state in the financing of supervisors 
might weaken the independence of supervisors, and it might even cause an exposure of 
supervisors to political pressures. Removing the state contribution was aimed exactly to 
eliminate or minimize the risk of government interference, in an environment where 
financial markets had been progressively freed from regulatory constraints and state in-
terventions in recent decades (at least until the 2008 financial crisis). On the other hand, 
a funding mechanism based on industry fees might create a different problem: the risk 
that supervisors are “captured” by supervised entities. And, if the amount of contribu-
tions is based on the revenues of supervised entities, a market-based system could also 
produce a pro-cyclicality problem: revenues for supervisors would decrease in times of 
crisis, exactly when more resources are likely to be needed to exercise effective supervi-
sion. In this case, the market funding mechanism would not necessarily ensure financial 
independence (Di Noia and Piatti 1998).
The component of total expenses which is by far the most relevant is the cost for 
personnel, including net salaries as well as taxes and pension contributions. The share 
of this cost on total costs is generally between 60% and 80%: therefore, fees levied on 
supervised entities are to a large extent used to cover staff costs and, for this reason, an 
analysis of these costs appears particularly important, also to evaluate the impact on the 
industry of the market-based funding mechanism.
In this regard, a first measure to be considered is the number of people working for 
supervisors: in this count, we have included all types of workers, not only full-time em-
ployees but other categories as well, e.g. workers with temporary contracts, since they all 
have a cost for the supervisors. As shown in Figure 2.3, the size of supervisors in terms of 
staff has a huge variance across authorities: the UK FSA, which ceased its operation in 
early 2013, was by far the largest among the supervisors we focus on, with 3,631 workers 
as of 31 March, 2013. After the FSA was dissolved into the FCA and the PRA, its staff 
was split between the two new authorities, with the FCA retaining about 71% of the staff 
(2,589 as of 31 March 2014) and the PRA keeping about 29% (1,045 as of 28 February 
2014). At the end of 2013 the second largest supervisor by number of staff units was the 
German single regulator BaFin (2,398), followed by the supervisory department of the 
Bank of Italy (about 1,540 based on our estimates), the UK PRA (1,045) and the French 
ACPR (1,018.5; yearly average figure). All the other supervisors in our sample have a 
number of workers well below 1,000, with the highest value for Consob (618) and the 
lowest value for Covip (78). The ESAs, the Italian Ivass and the Spanish CNMV are in a 
range between 100 and 421. But it should be noted that the Ivass is housed at the central 
bank, therefore its 360 workers might be added to the Bank of Italy figure.
Some first considerations may be developed. First, single regulators appear to have 
larger staffs, which is not surprising since they have responsibility for the entire financial 
markets and for all objectives, unlike sectoral authorities or supervisors by objective. 
Second, the Bank of Italy staff for supervision and the staff of PRA and ACPR (both 
housed at the central bank) are both above 1,000: for all three cases the model of super-
vision is substantially by objective and they are all responsible for stability, suggesting 
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that stability might require a larger staff than other objectives and sectors. However, 
while this seems true with cross-country comparisons, the splitting of the FSA staff 
between the PRA and the FCA seems to indicate an opposite relationship, with many 
more workers focused on transparency and conduct of business.
Finally, unsurprisingly, the three ESAs have fewer workers than most other supervi-
sors, despite their European scope of activities: as recalled, they are mainly engaged in 
regulation, not supervision. The number of workers employed by the ECB to conduct 
its new supervisory functions will certainly provide interesting additional information 
on the size of the European layer of regulation and supervision.
Figure 2.3 – Staff of supervisors (units), yearend 2013
* March 2013 for FSA. Annual average for ACPR. Our estimates for Bank of Italy (22% of total staff is 
reported to be involved in supervision). 
Source: supervisors’ annual reports and other official documents.
Since the size of the supervised financial markets can be different, we have calculated a 
ratio between the number of staff of supervisors and the size of financial markets (for 
authorities with responsibilities on the entire financial market, e.g. single regulator or 
by objective, to make comparisons meaningful). Figure 2.4 shows that single regulators 
are still those with larger staff, even after controlling for the size of the financial markets. 
Another interesting information provided by the figure is that a “central bank effect” 
seems to be present: though its supervision does not cover all financial sectors, the num-
ber of the Bank of Italy staff involved in supervision, compared to the size of financial 
markets, has a magnitude which is in line with other single regulators, much higher than 
the other supervisors by objectives.9 Therefore, after correcting for financial markets size, 
9 In this calculation we have included in the Bank of Italy figure the IVASS staff.
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single regulators remain among the largest, but supervisors other than single regulators 
may also have a considerable size.
Times series on the number of staff units for each authority also provide useful in-
formation: generally supervisors tend to expand their work force over time. BaFin and 
FSA, the two supervisors with a large post-crisis increase in the amount of their revenues 
and costs, also experienced a huge increase in their staff. For the FSA, the increase from 
March 2007 to March 2013 was of about 900 units, a +33% change; for BaFin, the in-
crease was of about 700 unit, or + 41% (see figures in Appendix).
Figure 2.4 – Ratio between staff units of supervisors and size of financial markets (2013)*
* Size of financial markets calculated as the ratio between bank assets, stock market capitalization and 
debt securities over GDP. 
Sources: supervisors’ data for staff, IMF Global Financial Stability Report October 2014 for financial 
markets size.
Once we have discussed the size of authorities measured by the number of human 
resources employed, the next step is to measure the per capita cost of staff. The key 
rationale behind this measure is that the cost of personnel is the largest cost for super-
visors and it is a key driver affecting the amount of fees to be raised from the industry. 
The absolute value of such costs is correlated with size of the authorities, i.e. it is likely 
to be higher when the supervisor is larger (for example because it is a single regula-
tor) and lower for smaller supervisors (e.g. sectoral authorities). In order to get more 
precise information about the costs for supervisory activities and their impact on the 
industry we need to relate the costs of staff to the number of staff employed. In fact, 
our results, reported in Figure 2.5 for 2013, show that single regulators are not neces-
sarily the most costly in terms of unitary cost of staff; and that, on the other hand, 
regulators with a narrower mandate than single regulators may have higher figures in 
terms of per capita cost of staff.
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A crucial methodological issue must be emphasized here: the unitary cost of staff is 
calculated as the ratio between the total costs of staff, including salaries, tax and pen-
sion contributions, and the number of staff units. This implies that the per capita cost 
of staff we use does not indicate the average salary of workers, but their average cost for 
authorities. The reason why we focus on average cost rather than average salaries (which 
is certainly an interesting information as well), is that we use the measure to catch the 
impact in terms of overall costs for supervisors, which turn into fees for the industry. 
Supervised entities pay their fees on the basis of expected expenses, inclusive of all costs, 
and the total costs for staff do not include only net salaries. Clearly, the taxation rate in 
each country as well as the pension and social contributions rate will determine the level 
of the total costs of staff, given the amount of net salaries: therefore, the unitary cost of 
staff reflects also these factors and might be higher or lower for authorities of different 
countries due to differences in these variables.
Figure 2.5 – Per capita cost of staff (euro), 2013
Source: Computations on supervisors’ data and financial statements.
The UK PRA in 2013-2014 had a unitary cost of staff of 165,000 euro. The figure for the 
Bank of Italy (based on our estimates since precise figures are not publicly available)10 
was about 150,000 euro, while Consob had a value of about 145,000 euro. The UK FSA 
had a unitary cost of staff of 122,000 euro in its last year of operations, while the FCA 
10 We have estimated the cost of staff for supervisory activities as the 60% of the total cost of supervision. 
The 60% is the lower bound of the range observed for other authorities for the ratio of cost of staff to 
total expenses: therefore, our measure is prudent and might underestimate the cost. More transparency 
in the disclosure of segmental data on supervision might help and appears desirable for central banks.
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had a value of 115,000 euro in 2013-2014 and Ivass of 102,000 euro (again, it should be 
recalled that Ivass is an internal body of the Bank of Italy). The ACPR and EBA had a 
unitary cost of staff close to 100,000 euro and Covip was at 95,000 euro. ESMA and EI-
OPA lie between 70,000 and 80,000 euro, while CNMV had a value of 66,000. Finally, 
BaFin has a relatively very low value of about 58,000 euro.
The first indication that may be drawn from these numbers is that the scope of 
the activities of regulators is not necessarily correlated with the unitary cost of staff: 
for example, BaFin has a very low figure despite being a single regulator, while on the 
other hand supervisors by sector or by objective (e.g. PRA, Bank of Italy, Consob) have 
a much higher per capita cost of staff. If we consider the average over a 10-year period, 
from 2004 to 2013, data indicate the same results, with Consob being the supervisor 
with the highest per capita cost of staff, followed by the FSA and by Ivass/Isvap. CNMV 
and BaFin have even lower average values in relative terms, with respect to 2013 (Figure 
2.6). For other authorities averages are generally in line with 2013 data, but are calculated 
on a shorter period because those supervisors were only set up in recent years. 
Figure 2.6 – Per capita cost of staff, averages over time (period for each supervisor indicated in parenthesis)
Source: computations on authorities’ financial statements and data.
A possible limitation of the figures on the per capita cost per staff might be related to the 
different size of supervised entities and markets for different authorities: the unitary cost 
of staff might be higher for one supervisor than for another supervisor simply because 
the size of the overseen financial sector is larger. Therefore, in order to correct the per 
capita cost of staff for the size of the supervised financial markets, we have calculated an 
index obtained as the ratio between the per capita cost of staff and the size of financial 
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markets, measured as the cumulative size of banks, stock and bonds markets relative to 
GDP (as we previously did with the number of workers). In order to have meaningful 
comparisons, we have focused on authorities whose scope of supervision covers the en-
tire financial markets (e.g. regulators by objectives and single regulator). We find that, 
even after taking into account the size of the banking and financial markets, the results 
are in line with the absolute values of per capita cost of staff, with Consob having by far 
the highest figure among the selected supervisors (Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7 – Ratio between per capita cost of staff and size of financial markets (2013)*
Size of financial markets calculated as the ratio between bank assets, stock market capitalization and debt 
securities over GDP. 
Sources: computations on supervisors’ annual reports and other official documents for per capita cost of 
staff, IMF Global Financial Stability Report October 2014 for financial markets size.
The key question concerns the drivers of such large and persistent variations in the per 
capita cost of staff across authorities and across countries. Despite having the high-
est numbers in terms of staff, single regulators appear able to keep the unitary cost of 
staff lower. While it may be difficult to find a conclusive answer, some hypothesis may 
be discussed. First, the differences in tax, pension and social contributions rates across 
countries might explain part of the differences in the per capita cost of staff. Second, the 
salary component might be higher for some authorities: supervisors might pay higher 
salaries in the attempt to attract human capital. Or, higher salaries might be associated 
to cultural factors and a high social status of supervisors. Finally, higher costs might 
indicate that supervisors’ staff is particularly effective at achieving their objectives and 
higher compensation would reward such effectiveness – here we enter the domain of the 
benefits of supervision, that we will discuss in Chapter 3.
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2.2.4 A focus on Italian micro-authorities
Finally, we have collected data also for the so-called “micro-authorities”. These bod-
ies are entrusted with the tasks of keeping registers and lists of professionals operat-
ing in the banking, securities and insurance sectors11. In some cases, they are also 
entrusted with supervisory and disciplinary powers, which make them similar to 
“primary” supervisors. Micro-authorities may be established to carry out specific ac-
tivities and thus reduce the amount of work and tasks assigned to primary supervi-
sors.12 There is a huge debate about the opportunity to introduce micro-authorities. 
On the one hand, the – already complex – supervisory architectures may become 
even more complex and less efficient. On the other hand, setting micro-authorities 
allows to increase the proximity of financial supervisor to supervised entities, which 
is a crucial factor when the latter are numerous and spread over the country, as 
the intermediaries involved in financial products distribution. Overall, the choice 
of adopting the micro-authorities model has to be read within the context of the 
specific regulatory framework, which can show some significant differences across 
our sample countries. So, for example, different regulations on the off-site offer of 
financial products are expected to affect the institutional and organization structure 
of supervision as well as its cost.
The choice to assign specific regulatory and supervisory powers on specific and lim-
ited areas to separate micro-authorities is not too common in Europe. Primary supervi-
sors may decide to assign those tasks to internal divisions rather than to external authori-
ties. However, a number of micro-authorities have been established for example in Italy 
(and others will be established). Here we will focus on the APF (Albo dei Promotori 
Finanziari) and the OAM (Organismo degli Agenti e dei Mediatori).
APF is the body in charge of keeping the Single Register of Promotori Finanziari13 
and is operational since January 1st, 2009; it was estabilished in 2007 and took up tasks 
connected with keeping the register previously entrusted to the Consob. Consob has 
11 At the date of publishment of this paper a micro – authority in the insurance intermidiaries sector 
(ORIA) has been set forth by the italian legislator but it has not been estabilished yet. IVASS – the 
Italian Insurance sector Autority – continues to supervise insurance companies and insurance brokers 
and agents.
12 For a detailed analysis of Italian micro-authorities’ functions, powers and responsibilities see Lener 
(2013). The author discusses the possibility to more efficiently reorganize and to unify some of the dif-
ferent bodies, through, for example, the creation of a single body charged with keeping several registers 
or even, through a single register, appropriately divided into internal functional sections. In any case, 
the choice of the most rational solution for the current structure of second-level supervision has to be 
based on the uniformity of rules applicable to the persons enrolled in the registers and the similarities 
in the activities they carry on. 
13 Promotori finanziari are natural persons who, pursuant to article 31 of the Consolidated Law on Fi-
nance, are qualified as MiFID tied agents (cf. article 4(1)(29) of Directive 2014/65/EU – MiFID II). 
Promotori finanziari act on the behalf and under the responsibility of only one financial intermediary 
and are authorized to promote investment and/or ancillary services, receive and transmit instructions 
or orders from clients, place financial instruments or provide advice to clients in respect of those finan-
cial instruments or services.
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retained the disciplinary/supervisory powers on promotori finanziari. The organization 
and management of APF is assigned to a number of associations: ABI (Associazione 
Bancaria Italiana), ANASF (Associazione Nazionale dei Promotori Finanziari), ASSO-
RETI (l’Associazione delle Società per la Consulenza agli Investimenti). APF is organi-
zationally and financially autonomous and it establishes fees to be paid by promotori 
finanziari and by individuals registering and applying to take the evaluation test. APF is 
subject to the supervision of the Consob.
APF has the following tasks: i) deciding on registrations in and cancellations from 
the promotori finanziari register, changes to existing entries and the issue of related 
certificates; ii) launching and organizing the evaluation tests for access to the promotori 
finanziari register; iii) timely updating of the register based on measures adopted against 
promotori finanziari by legal authorities, Consob and the Authority itself; iv) monitor-
ing continued eligibility for entry in the register. 
APF operates in compliance with principles and rules established by Consob regu-
lation 16190 of 29 October 2007. Consob still plays a relevant role: it checks that the 
conduct of promotori finanziari with investors is diligent, correct and transparent; it 
enforces cautionary measures against them (suspension of activity for a maximum of 60 
days or, in specific cases, for as long as a year); it inflicts different sanctions (ranging from 
warning to disqualification from the register).
APF experience may provide a significant example of how the introduction of mi-
cro-authorities does not necessarily cause a decrease in efficiency of financial supervi-
sion, making quite questionable such a conclusion. In fact, annual fees paid by Italian 
promotori finanziari have decreased by more than 20% during the six-year period after 
January 2009, when APF started its activity, even if the number of promotori finanziari 
experienced a significant decrease, dropping from 59,000 to circa 53,000. Furthermore, 
it should be stressed that APF has massively invested in information and communica-
tion technology with very interesting results from a cost saving perspective since IT 
costs are of utmost importance for financial supervision. Among the other things, APF 
developed an IT platform for the evaluation tests to access the promotori finanziari reg-
ister and an e-learning platform that is widely used by the candidates, that were almost 
4,700 in 2013.
OAM, Organismo degli Agenti e dei Mediatori, is the body that manages the regis-
ters of financial agents and credit brokers. It was established in 2010 and took up tasks 
previously entrusted to the Bank of Italy. OAM is a private body with financial and 
organizational autonomy, subject to the supervision of the Bank of Italy; it obtains its 
funding from fees paid for the registration in the lists. OAM is entrusted with super-
visory powers: it verifies the respect of professional and personal requirements to be in 
the registers (consumer protection); it establishes standards for professional courses in 
preparation to the test for financial agents and credit brokers, and also the content and 
format of tests. OAM has also been assigned disciplinary powers: it may impose fines on 
members and can suspend them from the list.
Given the limited scope of activities, the size of APF and OAM is significantly 
smaller than the size of “primary” supervisors. Total revenues are about € 6 mln, almost 
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entirely coming from fees (Figure 2.8). However, the share of the cost of staff on total 
expenses (close to 30% for both) is significantly lower relative to primary supervisors. 
The size of these two micro-authorities is also small in terms of the staff employed, about 
30; the per capita cost of staff is also quite low, and much lower than Italian primary 
supervisors (Figure 2.9).
When comparing the two Italian micro-authorities based on 2013 data, it is impor-
tant to point out that: i) as of December 2013, the number of promotori finanziari was 
almost 51,300 whereas the number of financial agents and credit brokers stood at 9,700; 
ii) the number of in-house/outsourced activities is very different, since APF has many 
more in-house activities relative to OAM.
As concerns key income and expense data, total revenues and fees are equivalent, 
as shown in Figure 2.8, and stand at around €6 million. From a cost perspective, data 
provided by the two authorities have been adjusted in order to make them comparable. 
In fact, for example, we have considered that almost 1 out of circa 6 million euros of total 
expenses has been set aside by APF in order to financially support the implementation 
of new supervisory powers that are expected to be assigned to it. Personnel costs refer to 
a staff of 31 and 19.5 workers for APF and OAM, respectively. 
Figure 2.8 – APF and OAM: key income data, 2013 (mln euro)
Source: APF and OAM data.
The key question is whether spinning off limited specific functions from primary super-
visors and assigning them to separate micro-authorities can reduce the costs or increase 
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the benefits of supervision. Economies of scale might be lost, but the per capita cost of 
staff indicates that micro-authorities might be better able to keep costs lower, at least 
with regard to the costs of personnel.
Figure 2.9 – APF and OAM, staff and per capita cost of personnel, 2013*
* For the calculation of the OAM per capita personnel cost we have used the average number of staff 
during 2013 (19.5) rather than the year-end data, because a significant increase was recorded in Decem-
ber 2013. 
Source: APF and OAM data.
2.3  
key results and implications
The empirical analysis of the direct costs of supervision with cross-section and time 
series data offers a number of indications. First, supervisors tend to become larger over 
time, in terms of both budget and staff, and size increase might be higher after financial 
crises as a response to previous regulatory and supervisory failures. In a system with 
market-based funding of supervisors, the increase in the revenues and costs of authori-
ties might translate into higher costs for the industry: consequently, supervised firms 
might be required to pay higher fees exactly when they are more fragile in a post-crisis 
environment – a pro-cyclicality problem might emerge. 
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Second, the dominance of the market-based system for the financing of supervisors 
may free supervisors from political interferences, but on the other hand it might expose 
them to risk of regulatory capture by the industry. Moreover, such funding mechanism 
might turn out to be fragile in a crisis, when industry contributions might be lower, and 
potentially jeopardize the possibility for supervisors to perform effective monitoring and 
enforcement.
Third, direct costs are highly heterogeneous across authorities but they should be 
read in conjunction with the size of the supervised industry and market. And higher 
costs do not necessarily mean lower efficiency: it depends on how those financial re-
sources are spent and on what kind of supervisory output is produced (e.g. higher or 
lower degree of stability, transparency, etc.). In other words, cost analysis should go hand 
in hand with benefit analysis. 
Fourth, to correct for size bias, direct costs should be related to the number of staff 
employed. Since the cost of personnel is by far the most important expense, a measure 
of per capita cost of staff can be used to obtain some information on the actual costs of 
supervisors, regardless of their size. Comparisons between authorities should be extremely 
cautious here, but a key result seems to be that larger authorities – or single regulators – are 
not necessarily those with higher per capita cost of staff. The variance across supervisors 
is quite significant and also persistent over time, signaling some form of structural differ-
ences, also across countries. Different taxation rates as well as different pension and social 
contributions rates could play a role; cultural factors might also be relevant. Certainly, dif-
ferences across authorities are striking, and one is led to wonder whether supervisors with 
much higher values of per capita cost of staff are able to deliver much higher supervisory 
outputs and benefits. To the issue of benefits we now turn in Chapter 3.
Fifth, data on the revenues, costs and staff of supervisors are generally publicly avail-
able: however, the format and reporting differ across authorities and countries. Consist-
ency in the income and expense statement format across regulators in European coun-
tries – and within European countries – is highly desirable and would facilitate analysis 
and comparisons. Unfortunately, data for some supervisors are simply not available, or 
just partially available: this is the case of central banks (Bank of Italy and Bank of Spain 
in our sample), which do not report, or only report limited and not systematic income 
and expense information on their supervisory activities. A requirement for central banks 
to publish a segmental financial reporting for supervision would be helpful. A similar 
requirement should apply to supervisory departments housed within ministries (in our 
sample, the insurance supervisory department at the Spanish Ministry of Economy). 
Moreover, it would be extremely important to introduce a disclosure requirement for 
all financial markets authorities to publish, according to consistent cross-authorities and 
cross-countries formats and definitions, segmented data on staff and costs related to 
regulatory activities on one side and supervisory functions on the other side. Such seg-
mented information would significantly facilitate a better understanding of the func-
tioning of authorities and would strengthen comparisons between them.
56 2. The costs of financial supervision
appendix 2
Figure 2.10 – Consob, revenues and expenses (mln euro)
*Surplus from previous year not included. 
Source: Consob
Figure 2.11 – Consob, main sources of funding (% of total revenues)
Source: computations on Consob data.
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Figure 2.12 – Consob, staff (units)
Source: Consob.
Figure 2.13 – Consob, cost of staff on total expenses
Source: computations on Consob data.
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Figure 2.14 – Consob, per capita cost of staff (euro)
Source: computations on Consob data.
Figure 2.15 – Isvap/Ivass, revenues and expenses (mln euro)
Source: Isvap, Ivass.
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Figure 2.16 – Isvap/Ivass, industry fees, % of total revenues
Source: computations on Isvap/Ivass data.
Figure 2.17 – Isvap/Ivass, staff (units)
Source: Ivass/Isvap.
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Figure 2.18 – Isvap/Ivass, cost of staff on total expenses
Source: computations on Isvap/Ivass data.
Figure 2.19 – Isvap/Ivass, per capita cost of staff (euro)
Source: computations on Isvap/Ivass data.
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Figure 2.20 – Covip, revenues and expenses (mln euro)
*Surplus from previous year not included. 
Source: Covip. 
Figure 2.21 – Covip, sources of funding (% of total revenues)
Source: computations on Covip data.
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Figure 2.22 – Covip, staff (units)
Source: Covip.
Figure 2.23 – Covip, cost of staff on total expenses
Source: computations on Covip data.
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Figure 2.24 – Covip, per capita cost of staff (euro)
Source: computations on Covip data.
Figure 2.25 – FSA, revenues and expenses (mln euro)
Source: computations on FSA data.
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Figure 2.26 – FSA, industry fees, % of total revenues
Source: computations on FSA data.
Figure 2.27 – FSA, staff (units)
Source: FSA data.
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Figure 2.28 – FSA, cost of staff on total expenses
Source: computations on FSA data.
Figure 2.29 – FSA, per capita cost of staff (euro)
Source: computations on FSA data.
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Figure 2.30 – PRA and FCA, revenues and expenses (mln euro), 2013-2014
Source: PRA and FCA.
Figure 2.31 – PRA and FCA, industry fees, % of total revenues, 2013-2014
Source: computations on PRA and FCA data.
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Figure 2.32 – PRA and FCA, staff (units), 2014*
*Data as 28 February 2014 for PRA and as of 31 March 2014 for FCA. 
Source: PRA and FCA.
Figure 2.33 – PRA and FCA, cost of staff on total expenses, 2013-2014
Source: computations on PRA and FCA data.
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Figure 2.34 – PRA and FCA, per capita cost of staff (euro), 2013-2014
Source: computations on PRA and FCA data.
Figure 2.35 – BaFin, revenues and expenses (mln euro)
Source: BaFin.
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Figure 2.36 – BaFin, industry fees*, % of total revenues
*Only costs allocated to banks, insurance and securities trading are counted; administrative income 
(including some types of fees) is not included. 
Source: BaFin.
Figure 2.37 – BaFin, staff (units)
Source: BaFin.
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Figure 2.38 – BaFin, cost of staff* on total expenses
*Cost of staff for 2004 from the 2004 budget (actual data not available). 
Source: computations on BaFin data.
Figure 2.39 – BaFin, per capita cost of staff* (euro)
*Cost of staff for 2004 from the 2004 budget (actual data not available). 
Source: computations on BaFin data.
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Figure 2.40 – CNMV, revenues and expenses (mln euro)
Source: CNMV.
Figure 2.41 – CNMV, industry fees, % of total revenues
Source: computations on CNMV data.
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Figure 2.42 – CNMV, staff (units)
Source: CNMV.
Figure 2.43 – CNMV, cost of staff on total expenses
Source: computations on CNMV data.
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Figure 2.44 – CNMV, per capita cost of staff (euro)
Source: computations on CNMV data.
Figure 2.45 – ACP/ACPR, revenues and expenses (mln euro)
Source: ACP/ACPR.
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Figure 2.46 – ACP/ACPR, industry fees, % of total revenues
Source: computations on ACP/ACPR data.
Figure 2.47 – ACP/ACPR, staff (units*)
*Yearly averages. 
Source: ACP/ACPR.
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Figure 2.48 – ACP/ACPR, cost of staff on total expenses
Source: computations on ACP/ACPR data.
Figure 2.49 – ACP/ACPR, per capita cost of staff (euro)
Source: computations on ACP/ACPR data.

Chapter 3 
The effectiveness of financial supervision
3.1 
measuring the effectiveness of financial supervisors:  
beyond the cost-side analysis
The quality of financial sector supervision has proven to be a key issue during the fi-
nancial crisis. Differences in the impact of the crisis on countries with financial systems 
operating under the same set of global rules can be explained also by differences in the 
effectiveness of supervisory activity. The response to the crisis has stressed the need for 
more and better regulation, but policy makers have devoted less attention to analyze 
whether and how supervision could be strengthened as well. Viñals and Fiechter (2010) 
pointed out that the assessments of financial sector supervisory and regulatory standards 
conducted by the IMF1 show that many countries have to fill a relevant gap as concerns 
supervision across the different financial sectors.2 
In this chapter we aim at providing an analysis of the effectiveness of financial su-
pervision. In order to fully evaluate the overall adequacy and sustainability of a financial 
supervision system, we have to go beyond the cost analysis developed in chapter 2: it 
becomes crucial to detect whether the benefits of financial supervision offset its costs. 
Setting a performance management system analyzing the effectiveness of financial su-
pervisors’ activity is important from both the public stakeholders’ and the supervisors’ 
point of view (Baldwin and Black, 2007, Hilbers et al., 2013). 
Since the benefits for the public stakeholders can be easily imagined, let’s focus on 
the potential benefits for the supervisors themselves, first by recalling that the effects of 
financial supervision can be measured at three different levels: strategic, tactical and op-
erational. From a strategic point of view, performance measurement enables a supervisor 
1 This is the so called Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which was established in 1999 and is 
a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of a country’s financial sector. In particular, FSAP assessments 
are the joint responsibility of the IMF and World Bank in developing and emerging market countries 
and of the Fund alone in advanced economies. They are made up of two major sections: a financial 
stability assessment, prepared by the Fund, and, for developing and emerging market countries, a 
financial development assessment which is made by the World Bank.
2 See IMF (2004a, 2004b) for an early evaluation of cross-sector issues highlighted by the Financial Sec-
tor Assessment Program. 
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to show the benefits stemming from its activity to stakeholders. From this perspective, 
performance measurement might result in an overview of aggregated measures, such as 
the level of confidence in financial markets, the transparency of financial markets and 
the degree of financial stability. Performance measurement at the tactical and opera-
tional level, on the other hand, is more focused on improving the quality and efficiency 
of the supervisory processes, because it allows a financial supervisor to analyze its ability 
to address specific market issues. Assessing the effects of supervisors’ interventions is 
necessary in order to determine whether a certain problem has been sufficiently miti-
gated and to decide the allocation of supervisory resources to another supervisory issue. 
Finally, from an operational point of view, performance management may also enhance 
knowledge about which interventions are effective under which circumstances3 and can 
be used to create organizational performance incentives.
3.2 
what is financial supervisory effectiveness  
and why is it so difficult to measure?
Financial supervision effectiveness can be defined as the degree to which supervisory prac-
tice contributes to the realization of supervisory objectives. These objectives can be grouped 
in two categories. The former is made up of objectives with a social relevance, such as to 
enhance the financial system stability, transparency and fair competition; the latter are the 
so called compliance objectives, according to which the supervisor has to make sure that 
supervised institutions actually comply with the existing rules (Hilbers et al., 2013).
Measuring the effectiveness in financial supervisory practice is not straightforward 
because of the difficulty of proving causality in analyzing financial institutions’ behav-
ior. For example, a change in a bank risk profile might have nothing to do with any 
supervisory intervention, but it might be caused by some exogenous factors. One way of 
finding a plausible answer to the causality question is to consider the counterfactual, i.e. 
to consider what would have happened if there had been no supervision, or if the super-
visor had not intervened. A traditional experimental research design would be helpful, 
but setting up an experimental research design is difficult in the context we study, first 
because it is not always possible to effectively separate the control group from the experi-
mental group.4 Furthermore, the selection of the intermediaries to include in the control 
group can be driven by the will to ignore certain undesirable behavior demonstrated by 
institutions within the control group. 
The second challenge in measuring the effects of supervision refers to the potentially 
conflicting short and long term effects of supervisors’ interventions. A financial supervi-
3 For example, performance measurement may show that increasing investor awareness causes an in-
crease in investment fund transparency about their costs. Consequently, supervisor might apply that 
similar strategy in other fields to boost transparency there as well.
4 For instance, let’s assume that the supervisor wants to improve the quality level of the financial services. 
Companies in the control group are likely to become aware of the supervisor’s intervention through the 
media and isolating them consequently becomes a very difficult task (Hilbers et al., 2013).
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sor may instruct a financial institution to sell off previously acquired complex invest-
ments because it lacks the appropriate level of risk management. In the short term, such 
a supervisory intervention may result in additional (transaction) costs and consequently 
may have an adverse impact on the institution’s financial position. In the longer term, 
however, the financial position may strengthen as the institution is no longer exposed to 
(investment) risks that it cannot adequately control (Hilbers et al., 2013). 
A third issue in trying to evaluate the effectiveness of financial supervisors’ inter-
ventions is referred to how and to what extent their effects can be shown to public 
stakeholders. In many cases, the duty of confidentiality makes it difficult for supervisors 
to make information about their interventions public. Let’s consider an intervention 
preventing a certain financial institution’s insolvency. The supervisor will strengthen the 
solidity of the financial institution, as well as increase public confidence in the specific 
institution and probably also in the financial sector as a whole. But what if the public 
loses confidence in the sector to which the institution belongs, or if the public believes 
that one company’s difficulties can affect also other institutions within the same sector? 
3.3 
measuring the effectiveness of financial supervision:  
effort vs. effect indicators and hard vs. soft indicators
Supervision objectives are difficult to be translated into what the performance measure-
ment literature defines SMART goals (Doran, 1982; Mayne, 1999; Hilbers et al., 2013), 
where the acronym stands for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-
bound. From this perspective, reducing the level of abstraction at which supervision 
effects are measured would help. In particular, according to Sparrow (2008), supervi-
sors should define their objectives in terms of risks or problems at a micro level and 
not in terms of financial stability or solid financial institutions.5 This would not allow 
to demonstrate a casual relationship between supervisory interventions and the social 
objectives, but micro results will show whether supervisors’ actions are result-oriented, 
analytical and effective.
In measuring the performance of a financial supervisor we have to distinguish between 
effort indicators and effect indicators. The former, such as input and throughput, do not 
show supervisory effectiveness but may be used to measure supervisory efficiency. As to 
effect indicators, they can be divided into three main categories: output, intermediate out-
come and final outcome. The term “output” usually refers to the direct consequences of 
supervisory activity. Largely used output indicators are the number of fines or the number 
5 For example, if a supervisor considers a specific product too risky for private investors and wants to 
prevent them from investing in it, a useful indicator for measuring effects at micro level would be the 
amount of investments in that specific product. It would be easier to demonstrate that additional on-
site visits strengthens the governance structure of a specific institution than to show that those visits 
had a positive effect on the overall system financial stability.
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of revoked licenses; but such indicators do not show whether financial institutions are 
actually making their behavior more consistent with rules in order to produce a socially 
desirable outcome. Therefore, in order to measure the impact of their actions in terms 
of public objectives, supervisors need to use outcome indicators as well. Unfortunately, 
outcome is not easy to measure, first because it might be affected by external events, and 
second because supervision may cause undesirable side effects. For example, regulation 
prohibiting financial intermediaries to receive fees from financial products providers aims 
at reducing incentives for financial intermediaries not to act in the best interest of their 
clients. This would force intermediaries to develop new earning models, that, in general, 
are supposed to be in the interest of their clients, but that may not automatically be true.
The objective of measuring the performance can be more effectively pursued if, 
instead of a single parameter, a set of performance indicators is used. The first reason is 
that a portfolio of indicators incorporates different perspectives and the final evaluation 
is less sensitive to outliers than the analysis of a single parameter.6 The selection of the 
indicators that have to be included in the portfolio is strongly related to the objective 
of the performance measurement. So, for example, if the objective is to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the supervisor, outcome indicators are generally most suited. 
Overall, in order to evaluate both the effectiveness and efficiency of a supervisor’s 
activity, we could monitor the soundness of the financial institutions under supervision 
(outcome), but we could also consider the number of on-site inspections performed or 
the number of fines (output) and the level of supervisory resources involved (input). Ac-
cording to Hilbers et al. (2013), a reasonable set of indicators could, for instance, include 
the following ones: i) number of policy initiatives (revisions) successfully adopted in 
(inter)national fora (outcome); ii) number of revisions in national regulation following 
a supervisor’s initiative (outcome); iii) number of international fora actively partici-
pated in (output); iv) number of seminars organized to influence key stakeholders in the 
policy environment (output); v) number of resources deployed on a specific supervisory 
theme (input); vi) number of resources participating in a (inter)national forum (input).
Literature on financial supervision effectiveness usually distinguishes between hard 
and soft indicators, based on quantitative and qualitative data, respectively (see Sijbrand 
and Rijsbergen, 2013; Hilbers et al., 2013). Overall, hard indicators are characterized by a 
higher degree of objectivity and verifiability, are straightforward to understand and can 
be easily monitored over time. Though they are less objectively observable and verifiable 
than many hard indicators, the importance of soft indicators has been growing in recent 
years because financial supervision is increasingly focused on forward-looking aspects 
such as governance, conduct and culture. 
6 Let’s suppose that a supervisor uses the number of the clients’ complaints to determine whether a 
certain company is improving its level of fair treatment of customers. When the number of complaints 
is used to increase customer awareness of the quality of advice given by the financial institutions, it is 
possible that this number rises, at least in the beginning, giving the impression that the company is 
not treating its customers fairly even if this is not the case. The number of complaints would increase 
because customer awareness in general might have augmented. 
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Those who use hard indicators examine how market players evaluate the risk profile 
of a certain financial institution. They typically take into account credit ratings, stock 
prices or the level of credit default swap spreads. One can also choose indicators referred 
to specific supervisory requirements, such as solvency and liquidity ratios for banks, 
insurers and other financial institutions (i.e., the total BIS ratio and Tier 1 ratio for 
banks)7. Both these types of indicators (market – and supervisory requirements – based 
indicators) should be adjusted to account for the impact of the economic cycle,8 in order 
to reduce the weight of external factors and make it easier to identify a causal relation-
ship between, say, the level of solvency ratios within the banking industry and banking 
supervisor’s interventions. Hard indicators can also refer to the number of bankruptcies 
among supervised institutions and the associated amount of losses.9 Alternatively, hard 
indicators can be represented by measures of economic benefits for consumers, even 
if calculating those measures is not straightforward.10 Finally, hard indicators can be 
obtained by looking at the time needed for supervisory activities such as procedures, 
applications, assessments, providing answers to questions.11 These latter are excellent in-
dicators for the efficiency of a supervisor, particularly helpful when estimating the effects 
of supervision at an operational level. However, it is noteworthy that throughout time 
they cannot fully capture the actual quality of the supervisory activities: for example, the 
assessment of a bank’s application for market access is crucial for the final achievement 
of the ultimate stability goal, but it can be a long-time consuming activity.
Qualitative information is at the basis of the so called soft indicators. Public confi-
dence in the financial sector or in financial supervisors is an example of soft indicator 
and is normally measured through periodic random surveys. Soft indicators can also 
be based on the outcome of external or peer reviews that measure the level of compli-
ance towards (inter)national supervisory standards.12 For example, through its Reports 
7 Among other quantitative indicators, it is worthwhile to recall the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority’s (APRA) Performing Entity Ratio (PER) and the Money Protection Ratio (MPR). The 
former is given by the ratio of the number of supervised institutions that meet their commitments to 
beneficiaries in a given year on the total number of supervised institutions; the latter is the dollar value 
of liabilities to beneficiaries that remained safe in a given year, divided by the total amount
8 Based on the known pro-cyclicality phenomenon, bank capital requirements tend to decrease during 
periods of economic growth and to increase during recessions. See, among the others, Panetta and 
Angelini (2009).
9 The U.S. Federal Reserve adopts an indicator measuring the losses from state member banks to the 
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and annually reports the outcome (Federal Reserve, 2011).
10 The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa), for example, publishes the directly quantifiable ben-
efits of formal supervisory actions, such as its decisions to impose sanctions on cartels, tariff regulations 
in the energy market and withdrawals of license applications (Hilbers et al., 2013).
11 The English FSA used to periodically report such indicators (FSA, 2011). In the United States, the 
Federal Reserve annually monitors the number of reports of its supervisory examinations that are 
completed within the established deadlines.
12 See again the above mentioned IMF FSAPs, where the IMF analyzes the resilience of the financial sec-
tor, the quality of the regulatory and supervisory framework, and the capacity to manage and resolve 
financial crises.
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Table 3.1 – Performance indicators at different levels
Source: Hilbers et al. (2013).
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on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), the IMF summarizes the extent 
to which countries observe certain internationally recognized standards and codes and 
examines the quality of member states’ supervision, based on international standards 
that represent minimum requirements for the supervision of banks, insurers and securi-
ties brokers. These standards include the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision 
and the IAIS Core Principles for Insurance Supervision (IMF, 2005). To provide some 
examples, in Appendix 3 we show three tables with some paragraphs extracted from the 
IMF Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes referred to the Italian financial 
system (IMF, 2013b), about the Bank of Italy, Ivass and Consob. Again, soft indicators 
about the effectiveness of financial supervision might be inferred from the content of the 
above mentioned IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programs. These reports conclude 
with the preparation of a Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSSA), which focuses 
on issues of relevance to IMF surveillance and on the compliance of a country’s finan-
cial sector with the most relevant international standards. In Appendix 3 we also report 
few paragraphs extracted from the Financial System Stability Assessment on the Italian 
financial system (IMF, 2013a) just to provide some examples. 
To conclude this section, the following Table 3.1, taken from Hilbers et al. (2013) 
provides an overview of the indicators that can be used to assess the effectiveness of 
financial supervision and identify whether they are suitable for the strategic, tactical or 
operation level. As already pointed out, relative to soft indicators hard indicators are 
more objective and more easily verifiable, generally easier to understand and monitor 
over time. Nevertheless, given the increasing need to focus on forward-looking aspects, 
the relevance of soft indicators is expected to grow in the near future.
3.4 
measuring the effectiveness of financial supervision through hard  
indicators: evidence from the european securities markets authorities
In this paragraph we present some data about the supervisory actions adopted by some 
of the major supervisors within the European countries considered in our research. We 
have to warn the reader that this analysis suffers from a significant data issue: first, not all 
supervisors provide useful and necessary information to assess the effectiveness of their 
actions; second, when they release some information, they do not follow a standardized 
format, so we have to face a huge heterogeneity in data provision and reporting across 
different countries. In order to provide a comparison among the supervisors we are inter-
ested in, we mainly look at data concerning inspections, investigations and fines, where 
possible, and we focus on the securities markets agencies of Italy, France, UK and Spain. 
We start this empirical analysis by examining the Italian Consob. The following Fig-
ure 3.1 presents the number of total inspections both concluded (panel A) and launched 
(panel B) by the Consob during the 7-year period 2007-2013. In both cases, we observe 
a sharp increase in the number of inspections relative to 2007, when the financial crisis 
broke out. In particular, the Consob concluded 36 inspections and launched 31 new 
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investigations13 concerning supervised entities in 2013, whereas it had concluded and 
launched 12 and 18 inspections, respectively, in 2007. On average the Italian authority 
launched/concluded 27 inspections per year during the observed time horizon. 
Figure 3.1 – Consob’s inspections (2007-2013)
Panel A: Concluded inspections
Panel B: Launched inspections
Source: Consob (2014).
The following Figure 3.2 shows the breakdown by category of supervised entity of the to-
tal number of inspections. Most of them concern listed companies, auditing companies 
and investment firms. The number of concluded inspections of listed companies and 
investment firms has increased over the years: it rose from 1 in 2007 to 13 in 2013 for the 
former; it grew from 2 to 9 for the latter. On average, the Consob concluded 8 inspec-
tions on listed companies per year, 5 on auditing companies and banks, 6 on investment 
firms and 3 on asset management companies/SICAVs. The average number of launched 
inspections per year is in line with that of concluded inspections for all the categories of 
intermediaries taken into account.
13 It should be noted, however, that the inspection activity experienced a significant increase during 2014, 
with 41 launched inspections.
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Figure 3.2 – Consob’s inspections: breakdown by category of supervised entity (2007-2013)
Panel A: Concluded inspections
Panel B: Launched inspections
Source: Consob (2014).
Inspections concerning intermediaries are usually driven by complaints, which in 2013 
totaled 414, showing a 10% increase relative to 2012 mainly because of the increase in 
the number of reports on trading and receipt of orders (see Figure 3.3). Nevertheless, 
it is noteworthy that the total number of complaints is definitely lower than both the 
maximum observed in 2004 and the relative (but much lower) post-crisis peak recorded 
in 2009.
In 2013, 142 disciplinary proceedings were concluded, of which 135 resulted in the 
application of a sanction due to ascertained breach of the provisions of the Consolidated 
Law on Finance and implementation regulations. Total penalties applied amounted ap-
proximately to 32.5 million euro, more than tripled relative to 2012, but definitely lower 
than the amount of sanctions imposed in 2007. Most sanctions are referred to the viola-
tion of market abuse-related provisions (see Figure 3.4). 
Now let’s analyze some characteristics of the enforcement activity run by the French 
Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF). As pointed out in chapter 2, within the newly sim-
plified supervisory architecture of the French financial system, the AMF is in charge of trans-
parency and conduct of business. In particular, the AMF carries out surveillance to safeguard 
the quality of financial disclosure and monitor financial intermediaries’ compliance with 
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their professional obligations. The AMF conducts inspections and investigations, through 
which it performs: day-to-day market surveillance, which includes monitoring trading and 
trader behavior to detect market anomalies; documentary audits and on-site inspections of 
investment services providers (ISPs), including asset management companies and financial 
investment advisers, to ensure they comply with the rules of their profession; investigations, 
which particularly look at financial disclosures and market abuse. Most investigations origi-
nate from market surveillance, supervision of listed companies, or from market complaints. 
To carry out its duties, the AMF can call on external auditing bodies, such as the Banque de 
France, Euronext Paris, the central depository and audit firms.
Figure 3.3 – Complaints about investment services received by the Consob (2002-2013)
Source: Consob (2014).
Figure 3.4 – Financial penalties imposed by the Consob (mln euro) – (2001-2013)
Source: Consob (2014).
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As of 2013, AMF’s supervisory activities extended to 613 asset management companies, 
91 investment firms, 249 credit institutions that provide investment services and 4,883 
financial investment advisers. If irregularities are suspected, the AMF may open an in-
vestigation into possible market offences, such as insider dealing, price manipulation 
or dissemination of false information. The nature of investigations is such that they are 
never predictable and, unlike inspections, the sequence of events cannot be set out in 
advance, because each investigation depends on the specific aspects of the case. Investi-
gations are undertaken when a situation raises suspicions of market abuse by an issuer, 
an individual or institutional investor, a market professional or any other person or en-
tity. The AMF General Secretary presents a written report on every investigation to one 
of the specialized commissions of the AMF Board, which may then decide to activate 
sanction proceedings. The following Figure 3.5 shows that the AMF opened 77 investi-
gations in 2013 (80 one year before) and 83 investigations were closed (74 in 2012). On 
average the French agency launched and concluded, respectively 81 and 83 investigations 
per year over the 7-year time horizon taken into account.
Figure 3.5 – AMF’s investigations (2007-2013)
Source: AMF (2014).
As concerns on-site inspections, they are initiated by the AMF General Secretary. The 
findings of the inspections are written up in a report, which is then submitted to the 
inspected entity, unless the AMF Board decides otherwise. The entity is then asked to 
submit its remarks in writing. In each case, a follow-up letter listing the remedial ac-
tion to be taken is then sent to the entity. If the report reveals serious misconduct, it is 
forwarded to the AMF Board, which determines whether there are grounds for initiat-
ing sanction proceedings. The following Figure 3.6 shows the number of direct and 
delegated inspections over the period 2010-2013 and the breakdown by type of financial 
intermediary. Overall, in 2013 we observe an increase in the number of both the direct 
and delegated inspections, relative to 2012. In particular, in 2013 the AMF was directly 
involved in 52 (38 in 2012) direct inspections and 15 (9 in 2012) inspections were delegat-
ed to other entities. On average, the French authority conducted a total of 58 inspections 
88 3. The effectiveness of financial supervision
per year in the 2010-2013 period, of which 23 were delegated to other entities and 35 were 
direct interventions. As concerns the breakdown by type of intermediary, on average, for 
each year of the 4-year time horizon we take into account, the AMF ran 22 inspections 
on asset management companies, 17 on investment services providers (other than asset 
management companies) and 20 on financial investment advisers.
Figure 3.6 – AMF’s inspections (2010-2013)
Panel A: Direct and delegated inspections
Panel B: Breakdown by type of intermediary
Source: AMF (2014).
(1) not including the asset management companies.
The Spanish Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNNV) focuses on improv-
ing the quality of information disclosure to the market. The actions of the Commission 
concern companies which issue securities for public placement, the secondary markets in 
securities and investment services companies. The Commission also exercises prudential 
supervision over brokers-dealers, collective investment schemes and portfolio manage-
ment companies in order to ensure transaction security and the solvency of the system. 
In 2013 the CNMV made a significant effort to strengthen preventive supervi sory 
actions in the field of investment service providers so as to detect and control problems 
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for investors as early as possible. The CNMV sent out 1,170 deficiency letters to super-
vised entities, 15% more than 2012. 71% of these letters originated from off-site supervi-
sion, while the rest originated from on-site inspections. Table 3.2 presents a breakdown 
of the defi ciency letters by subject. Almost half of the letters fall under the heading 
“Other notifications”, which includes informative letters addressed to the sector (which 
includes those relating to the procedure for sending electronic deficiency let ters), notifi-
cations to other bodies and other documents.
Table 3.2 – Supervision of investment firms and credit and savings institutions: deficiency letters sent by 
the CNMV in 2013
Type of deficiency letter Off-site On-site Total
For late filing of information 137 22 159
Requests for information 171 204 375
Corrective measures or recommendations 36 47 83
Other notifications 492 61 553
Total 836 334 1,170
Source: CNMV (2014).
As concerns collective investment schemes (CIS), the CNMV’s supervisory activity 
in 2013 was also characterized by the special attention paid to preventive analysis. The 
agency’s objective was to check whether CIS management companies are able to ad-
equately comply with their obligations, correctly resolve conflicts of interest and pro-
vide suffi cient information on investments to the unit-holders of mutual funds and 
the shareholders of investment companies (SICAVs). The agency combined off-site 
supervision and on-site inspections. The former analyses the financial statements of 
the CIS, including a list of individual positions of the portfolio assets and the deriva-
tives of the registered CIS. On-site inspections take into account more specific aspects 
of the CIS which cannot be reflected in standardized reporting models. The CNMV 
sent 1,596 defi ciency letters, whose breakdown is shown in Table 3.3. A total of 537 
deficiency letters corresponded to late filing of information – mostly CIS audi tor’s re-
ports – while another 135 related to requests for information necessary for supervision 
of the entities different from that which is generally available. In addition, 630 letters 
were sent requesting the adoption of improvements to re solve the incidents detected 
during supervision. A further 294 other notifications were sent for different issues, 
but particularly in response to enquiries and, above all, those aimed at collecting the 
contact details of the entities.
Table 3.4 shows that in 2013, the CNMV initiated 37 new disciplinary proceed-
ings, investigating a total of 57 possible breaches. Over the year, the CNMV con-
cluded 20 proceedings which included a total of 40 breaches. Two of the concluded 
proceedings were initiated in 2011, fifteen in 2012 and three in 2013. In 2013 71 fines 
were imposed for a total amount of €4,150,000; they were 57 in 2012 and totaled more 
than €24 million.
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Table 3.3 – Supervision of collective investment schemes (CIS): deficiency letters sent by the CNMV in 2013
Type of deficiency letter Off-site On-site Total
For late filing of information 537 0 537
Requests for information 83 52 135
Corrective measures or recommendations 570 60 630
Other notifications 250 44 294
Total 1,440 156 1,596
Source: CNMV (2014)
Table 3.4: Proceedings initiated and concluded by the CNMV (2012-2013)
2012 2013
Number of proceedings initiated 30 37
Number of proceedings concluded 17 20
of which
initiated in 2010 2 -
initiated in 2011 9 2
initiated in 2012 6 15
initiated in 2013 - 3
Source: CNMV (2014)
Finally, we examine data released by the English Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
The FCA publishes the Enforcement Annual Performance Account, which looks at the 
fairness and effectiveness of the FCA’s enforcement function over its first year. In 2013/14 
the FCA took action against 28 individuals, imposing 26 prohibitions, and obtaining 5 
criminal convictions. The following Figure 3.7 shows the number of prohibitions im-
posed by the FCA/FSA over the period 2009-2014, which, after peaking in 2010-2011, 
started a decreasing trend down to the last available value of 26.
To give some more details about the enforcement process, the following Figure 
3.8 shows in panel A the total number of fines and in panel B their total value. The 
number of fines shows a trend which is very close to that observed for the num-
ber of prohibitions: the number of fines was 83 in 2010/2011, when it reached its 
maximum, and then started a constant decline to the value of 46 referred to the 
2013/2014 financial year, with an average value of 57. On the contrary, the total value 
of the fines imposed has dramatically increased in the last two available financial 
years, if compared to the first three years of the time horizon taken into account: it 
rose from £33.6 million observed in the financial year 2009/2010 to £425 million of 
the financial year 2013/2014.
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Figure 3.7 – Number of prohibitions imposed by the FCA/FSA
Source: FCA
Figure 3.8 – FCA’s fines
Panel A: Total number of fines
Panel B: Total value of fines (£ million)
Source: FCA.
Being aware of both the data-related issues affecting this analysis, but also in light of 
the results of the direct costs analysis of main European supervisors presented in chap-
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ter 2, a very preliminary consideration about the effectiveness of financial supervision 
can be provided. Focusing on authorities in charge of supervision on securities markets 
and entrusted with the goals of transparency and conduct of business (namely Consob, 
AMF, CNMV and FCA), it appears that the higher direct costs – especially the per 
capita cost of staff – of the Italian authority do not correspond to a higher effectiveness 
of its supervisory action, at least if we measure it through the rough, “hard” indicators 
of an authority’s output taken into account here.
3.5 
concluding remarks
The financial crisis has not only triggered developments in financial legislation and regu-
lation. In fact, financial supervisors’ performance was brought into question and both 
stakeholders and supervisors themselves started to take a critical look at supervisory 
quality and effectiveness.14 Over the past years, supervision itself and supervisors’ meth-
ods have undergone fundamental changes. The available supervisory toolkit is consider-
ably wider than before.
Nevertheless, we believe it is worthwhile to focus on the key attributes that still 
make supervision effective. Starting from what the crisis has taught us, overall, supervi-
sion has to become more forward looking, also accounting for so called “soft” controls, 
such as business models and culture of supervised financial institutions. In fact supervi-
sors have traditionally adopted a backward looking approach, based on past financial 
performance. For this reason supervisors were often late by the time a financial institu-
tion’s performance showed its problems. 
Then, due to the higher interconnectedness characterizing the financial sector, su-
pervision should adopt a stronger macro-perspective by looking beyond individual in-
stitutions (Kellermann et al., 2013). Connecting macroprudential analysis with micro-
prudential supervision would strengthen the surveillance of risk factors that can pose a 
threat to the entire sector (Brunnermeier et al. 2009). As financial institutions are be-
coming more and more internationally active, the need for international arrangements 
for cross-border supervision is increasing and the necessity of a more internationally 
oriented supervision for cross-border institutions has been dramatically highlighted by 
the crisis.
Beyond that, traditionally required standards for sound and effective supervision 
should be adequately stressed. Good supervision must be intrusive, in the sense that, 
since it is based on a deep knowledge of the supervised entity, supervision cannot be 
outsourced and cannot rely solely or mainly on offsite analysis. Keeping in mind the 
peculiar nature of financial intermediaries, financial supervisors have to be involved in 
the daily monitoring of the industry. Good supervision must be skeptical but proactive: 
14 Here we mention only two examples from European countries: in the UK, the Turner Review made 
recommendations for the supervisory approach to be adopted (FSA 2009); De Nederlandsche Bank 
published a new Supervision Strategy for 2010–2014 that translated the lessons learned from the crisis 
into a new method of supervision and new areas of attention for supervisors (DNB 2010).
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supervisors must question, even in good times, supervised firms’ behavior, they should 
rely less on subtle strategies of soft enforcement and persuasion because the crisis has 
also showed that moral suasion has lost some of its effectiveness (Viñals and Fiechter, 
2010). Supervision must be intrinsically countercyclical, especially during good times. 
Supervisors must be able not only to understand how institutions are currently doing, 
but also how they will be able to cope with changing circumstances. Independence and 
accountability arrangements are essential foundations of supervisory governance and 
have a positive impact on the soundness of the financial system (see Masciandaro et al., 
2008 for an analysis referred to the banking system). According to Quintyn and Taylor 
(2002) accountability and independence are somewhat complementary to each other, 
in the sense that supervisors can increase their independence by being transparent. Ef-
fective supervision should be comprehensive. Even while recognizing the limitations of 
their scope, supervisors must be ready to identify emerging risks, such as those arising 
from systemically financial institutions, interconnectedness and cyclicality. Due to the 
constant innovation characterizing modern financial systems, supervision has also to be 
adaptive. Consequently, supervisors should closely follow changes in business models of 
financial institution and adapt to changes in the perimeter of regulation. The traditional 
fines and instructions have proven to be instruments with a scant preventive power. 
That’s why financial supervisors have started focusing on how to influence the behavior 
of supervised companies and have been increasingly relying on communication as an in-
strument to reach their objectives. Finally, supervision has to be conclusive, in the sense 
that supervisors must follow through conclusively on matters that are identified as these 
issues progress through the supervisory process. 
Financial supervisors are expected to improve their performance measurement and 
management systems. Nevertheless, we believe that the importance of adequately back-
ing institutional foundations should be reaffirmed. In order to make financial supervi-
sion more effective, the policy and institutional environment must support the super-
visory will and ability to act. This means that the following requirements should be 
satisfied: i) a clear and credible mandate; ii) a legal and governance structure that pro-
motes operational independence; iii) adequate budgets that provide sufficient resources; 
iv) a framework of laws that allows for the effective discharge of supervisory actions; and 
v) tools commensurate with market sophistication. 
Finally, our preliminary analysis of the benefits of supervision, measured through 
selected hard indicators for a sample of authorities in charge of transparency and securi-
ties markets supervision, does not seem to indicate a correlation between higher direct 
cost of supervision – especially with regard to the per capita cost of staff – and higher 
benefits produced by supervisory actions. We are aware that there is significant room 
for refinement and strengthening of the benefits analysis, and of the relevant conceptual 
and technical challenges involved: future research might expand the benefits analysis by 
including more hard indicators and soft indicators and enlarging the scope of the inves-
tigation to include more authorities.
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Appendix 3
This Appendix aims at showing how soft indicators of supervision effectiveness can be 
extracted from the outcome of external reviews that measure the level of compliance 
towards (inter)national supervisory standards. 
We first consider the IMF Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
referred to the Italian financial system (IMF, 2013b). Table 3.A.1 focuses on IMF staff’s 
comments about the Bank of Italy’s overall supervisory approach and the tools and 
techniques at the supervisor’s disposal, in comparison with Basel Core Principles. 
Table 3.2.A presents IMF staff’s comments about the compliance of IVASS overall 
structure and organization with what required by the Insurance Core Principles in 
terms of resources, accountability, transparency, independence, legal protection, and 
so on. Table 3.A.3 focuses on the compliance of the Italian standards in terms of in-
spection, investigation and surveillance powers of the Bank of Italy and Consob with 
the IOSCO principles of securities regulation.
Table 3.A.1 – Summary compliance with the Basel Core Principles – ROSC
Core principles Comments
8. Supervisory approach
Setting the scope for the supervisory activities for individual banks is a forward looking risk-based pro-
cess. Banks are categorized based on systemic significance and level of risk. In determining the level of 
risk, BI incorporates not only current risk indicators but also looks at risk management and corporate 
governance issues that may lead to future problems. The analysis of individual banks and banking groups 
is complemented by macro-prudential analysis that aims at identifying vulnerabilities in the financial 
system that may pose systemic risks and affect the real economy. SREP is performed annually and re-
sults in banks being assigned a risk rating that is used to determine the appropriate supervisory scope of 
activities for the bank.
9. Supervisory techniques and tools
The supervisory process is detailed and involves a blend of onsite and offsite activities. The process 
is based on a compendium of activities contained in the SREP guidance; some of the key elements 
of which include: Risk Assessment System, ICAAP, credit registry, onsite inspections, and offsite 
reviews. Offsite analysis is systematic, carried out at set intervals, and based on analysis of data and 
information that banks report to BI. Based on the offsite analysis results, inspections are planned and 
carried out. Inspections may be: full scope, targeted (business areas, specific risks, operational profiles, 
corrective action follow-up) and horizontal. Inspections focus on exposure to significant risks and risk 
management: adequacy of structural and functional components of governance and control systems, 
as well as economic and capital safeguards; the reliability of data and information given to BI; the 
compliance with the regulatory framework with particular attention to prudential requirements.
Source: IMF (2013b).
Table 3.A.2 – Summary compliance with the Insurance Core Principles – ROSC
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Core principles Comments
2. Supervisor
The supervisor, in the exercise of its functions and powers: is operationally independent, accountable 
and transparent; protects confidential information; has appropriate legal protection; has adequate 
resources; and meets high professional standards.
IVASS is a newly established authority (formerly ISVAP) for the supervision of insurance, now operating 
with the Bank of Italy, under the oversight of the President of IVASS (who also serves as the Director 
General of the Bank of Italy) and Council of IVASS, who serve with banking regulators in a Joint Direc-
torate responsible for strategic financial and insurance supervision.
The Council is in charge of IVASS organization, personnel, budget decisions, and IVASS internal mat-
ters. The currently published list of Joint Directorate, president and council responsibilities indicate 
that virtually all supervisory, inspection and anti-fraud decisions, international relations, consumers, 
intermediaries and loss adjusters must be approved by the president and council. The list is comprehen-
sive and includes such ministerial functions as writing letters to insurers for routine documentation for 
supervisory activity, to invitations to consumer associations to schedule meetings with IVASS staff. Once 
IVASS is fully organized and structured in the next 120 days, it is recommended that the president and 
council exercise the authority to delegate ministerial matters to appropriate
heads of IVASS Divisions.
Internal audit is performed by one staff member that also has other duties. The scope and audit detail 
need to be strengthened, which will require additional resources.
The supervisory process is informal and quality control over the supervisory process is lacking in formal 
supervisory processes.
It is recommended that IVASS develop clear and consistent fundamental procedures for financial analy-
sis supervision that identify troubled companies and then implement a troubled company task force.
The assessors recommend instituting a formal internal quality controls process for supervision and the 
development of formal supervisory processes that allow for emergency action and cross checking of the 
activities of each supervisory division to ensure accuracy and consistency in regulatory action. 
IVASS has the discretion to directly hire up to 5 percent (20 persons) of staff without public competition. 
This provides IVASS with the availability to have access to specialized skills, if needed.
While the powers to take immediate action are enacted in regulation, supervisory action suffers delays. 
There have been a few examples of undue delays requiring several years of ISVAP periodically writing 
letters, before it finally took action to shut down an unsound operation and notify consumers.
Following the financial crisis, Parliament introduced elements of asset evaluation in anti-crisis measures 
that are not market consistent and deviate from established accounting principles; however, IVASS has 
maintained regulatory oversight of the insurer’s financial position as companies are obliged to disclose all 
calculations with and without application of the anti-crisis measures, and IVASS still has the power to 
intervene in regulatory solvency situations.
Source: IMF (2013b).
In the rest of this appendix we report some paragraphs extracted from the Financial System 
Stability Assessment on the Italian financial system (IMF, 2013a). Paragraphs 43 and 44 are 
referred to the compliance of Italian banking sector regulation and supervision with the Basel 
Core Principles (BCP), paragraphs 45, 47, 48 and 49 provide information about the compli-
ance of Italian regulation and supervision on securities markets with the IOSCO (Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions) standards, and, finally, paragraphs 50, 51 and 
53 are taken from the analysis of the compliance of the Italian insurance sector regulation and 
supervision with the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) principles.
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Table 3.A.3 – Summary implementation of IOSCO objectives and principles of securities regulation – 
ROSC
Core principles Comments
Principle 10. The Regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and surveillance 
powers.
Both BI and Consob have been given broad powers to supervise, and inspect regulated entities, conduct 
surveillance of authorized securities markets, and conduct investigations in connection with breaches 
to securities laws. To this end, they both have been given compulsory powers commensurate to their 
respective mandates.
Principle 12. The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of inspection, 
investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of an effective compli-
ance program.
The supervisory approach of BI and Consob relies heavily on robust offsite monitoring and a more lim-
ited use of onsite inspections, although the coverage by market share (measured in terms of assets and 
clients) is high. The enforcement approach relies more on remedial actions, which while necessary might 
not be sufficient. Furthermore pecuniary sanctions imposed for offences other than market abuse/short 
selling violations are low to a large extent due to the limitations in the law and judicial practices. Crimi-
nal enforcement faces challenges, including a strong reliance on settlements and conditional execution 
which can detract from the deterrent effect that criminal enforcement should have. 
Source: IMF (2013b).
&&&
43. BI has a strong supervisory review process and applies Pillar 2 capital add-on extensively. 
The core supervisory process is well-defined, strong, and integrated. BI (Bank of Italy) has a well 
established reputation for independence, professional excellence, and integrity. The information 
used for supervision ranges from detailed credit registry records and extensive reporting to broader 
risk management overview contained in the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process, and 
these data are available to the offsite unit. As a result of Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
(SREP), banks receive risk assessment grades that determine the supervisory planning for each. Key 
risk areas (credit, financial, operational, profitability, capital, strategic and governance) are graded 
and an overall grade is assigned to the bank. The BI also takes corrective actions on quantitative 
issues, such as credit risk, loan classifications, and capital adequacy but also on qualitative issues, 
such as the adequacy of corporate governance and internal controls.
44. Gaps in the legal and regulatory framework are largely mitigated by intensive and 
intrusive supervisory action on- and offsite, on a bank-by-bank basis. However, there are 
areas requiring attention so that Italy can meet the highest standards of supervisory effectiveness. 
The lack of powers to suspend and remove individual directors and senior managers 
may hamper BI’s timely corrective action capacity. Furthermore, the narrow definition of 
fit and proper criteria should be expanded so that adverse regulatory judgments are taken into 
account for directors, and financial soundness—including the capacity to provide additional 
capital, if needed—for shareholders. Similarly, the lack of power to remove external auditors 
can be a significant limitation.
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The new regulation for related-party lending is an important addition to the pru-
dential framework. However, it has some gaps: some exposures are risk-weighted for the 
calculation of limits, there is no specific requirement that related-party lending is made on 
market terms, and it would have been preferable if the regulation had aligned the definition 
of related parties to that used for large exposures. The BI can use its supervisory discretion 
to apply stricter definitions of connected parties and stricter limits and controls (notably in 
situations when economic influence is the connecting element between the related parties), 
thereby mitigating these deficiencies through supervisory practice. But as this regulation is 
recent, enforcement has only just started.
The regulatory framework for management and control of country and transfer risk 
is not adequate. In practice, this is not a major supervisory gap, as the BI addresses this risk, 
if material, in the largest internationally active banks. Nevertheless, there are other Italian 
banks with exposures to country risk. The BI should therefore issue guidance that applies to 
all banks. Banks need to be made aware that an increase of credit risk in a country can lead 
to private contracts not being observed, independently of sovereign or currency risk.
…
45. Italy exhibits a very high level of implementation of the IOSCO principles. Overall, 
the legal and regulatory framework is sound and the regulatory authorities have implemented 
very sophisticated arrangements for offsite supervision that result in a robust system of supervi-
sion— indeed approaching global “best practice” in certain areas. These arrangements have 
been developed using extensive data reporting obligations that allow the BI and the securi-
ties supervisor, Consob, to have a much more precise understanding of intermediaries and 
products and their characteristics than is currently available to regulators in many advanced 
jurisdictions. Staff use these tools to the fullest to target their supervisory interventions. Fur-
thermore, analysis at a system wide-level by the BI complements microprudential supervision 
and helps in the identification of risk arising from the securities market.
[…]
47. Arrangements for offsite supervision need to be complemented by additional onsite 
inspections to make the system more effective. While the robustness and sophistication of 
offsite monitoring allow targeted use of onsite inspections, onsite work remains a key tool to 
identify weaknesses in conduct that cannot easily be detected via reporting. The same applies 
to operational risk, and more generally to poor governance, internal controls, and risk man-
agement systems.
48. Enforcement should also be strengthened. Remedial actions are a necessary component 
of any enforcement program, but they are not sufficient. Stronger fines should be a comple-
ment to remedial action. To this end, it is critical that sanctions may also be imposed on legal 
entities and that their level be increased. Criminal sanctions, in particular imprisonment, 
should be used sparingly and strategically to punish the most egregious violations and send 
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clear deterrence messages to the market. That said, it should be emphasized that this is a chal-
lenging area for regulators in both advanced and emerging economies.
49. Finally, the licensing framework should be strengthened and a few refinements to 
the current allocation of responsibilities between BI and Consob are encouraged. On the 
former, the definition of fit and proper should be expanded and the power to remove individ-
ual directors added to the toolkit. On the latter, the mission recommends that a consultation 
process with Consob be established for the review of applications by banks seeking to provide 
investment services. In addition, the current framework could benefit from a streamlining of 
the chosen twin peak structure, aimed at eliminating possible ambiguities or inconsistencies 
and strengthening the functional approach.
…
50. The IAIS assessment, based on the situation prior to the reorganization on January 1, 
2013 and the transformation of ISVAP into IVASS, found an adequate regulatory frame-
work but revealed several gaps. Although ISVAP had numerous staff, it was poorly organ-
ized, undertook relatively few inspections, and had weak internal quality control. These gaps 
are already being addressed by the ongoing reorganization. Valuation and capital practices 
are still based on the Solvency I framework and brokers are not properly supervised. However, 
risk management and consumer protection are strong.
51. Notwithstanding the high level of compliance with the IAIS principles, critical areas 
need improvement. Valuation and the use of capital are based on the Solvency I framework 
and need to include stronger risk sensitiveness. Further clarification of appropriate margins, 
parameters, and technical reserve calculation methodology is necessary to assure adequacy of 
technical reserves. A complete overhaul of the supervisory structure and processes, including 
quality controls and specialized onsite supervision is needed.
[…]
53. The use of stress testing as a supervisory tool by IVASS could be improved. IVASS’s 
annual industry-wide stress test has been replaced by the EIOPA stress test in the last years. 
The main disadvantage of this approach lies in lack of tailor-made shocks for the Italian 
market conditions to appropriately test resilience of the industry. Using market analysis, the 
individual stress tests reported by the insurance groups, and the early warning system tools 
currently in development, IVASS should design market-specific severe but plausible macro 
scenarios and test the resilience of the sector as a whole. Reverse stress testing as a regular su-
pervisory practice is also recommended.
Conclusions and policy implications
The aim of this research is twofold: first, providing a comprehensive analysis of the dif-
ferent institutional arrangements for financial regulation and supervision across main 
European countries and at EU/eurozone level, pointing out their respective advantages 
and disadvantages and describing their evolution over the last decades, with a focus on 
the impact of the recent financial crisis; second, shedding more light on the costs of su-
pervisory authorities, by providing both cross-sectional and time series data about direct 
costs of supervision, and also assessing the effectiveness of supervisors’ action.
As to the first objective, we highlight that: i) the recent financial crisis has shown that an 
optimal model of regulation and supervision does not exist; ii) the new EU/eurozone level 
of regulation and supervision adds further complexity to the mix of different national ar-
rangements already in place. In particular, the new ECB’s supervisory powers on the banking 
sector could not only create conflicts between different objectives pursued by the European 
Central Bank, but might also lead to inter-agency conflicts as concerns the potential trade-
off between stability (ECB) and transparency (ESMA). There is room to rationalize and 
simplify the current institutional framework. In particular, we believe that the adoption of a 
real twin-peak model would effectively reform the European institutional arrangements on 
financial supervision, by addressing the issues associated with ESMA’s limited enforcement 
power, contributing to the creation of a level playing field and reducing the possibility to reap 
competitive advantages through regulatory and supervisory arbitrage. 
With regard to the costs of financial supervision, our empirical analysis of direct 
costs shows some interesting evidence. Overall, authorities’ size and costs have experi-
enced an increasing trend over the last years, also as a response to the regulatory and 
supervisory failures highlighted by the financial turmoil. Since supervisors are typically 
funded by the supervised entities, a pro-cyclicality issue might emerge: the increase in 
the cost of supervision might translate into higher costs for the industry in a post-crisis 
environment, exactly when supervised institutions are more fragile. Though compari-
sons between authorities should be carefully handled, it seems that: i) the variance across 
supervisors of the cost measures adopted in this research is quite significant and also 
persistent over time, signaling some form of structural differences, also across countries 
(different taxation rates and pension and social contributions rates, as well as national 
cultural factors could help to explain these differences); ii) larger authorities – or single 
regulators – are not necessarily those with higher per capita cost of staff.
Moving to the discussion on the benefits of financial supervision, literature dealing with 
the analysis of financial supervisors’ performance and effectiveness usually distinguishes be-
tween hard and soft indicators, on the one hand, and between effort and effect indicators, on 
the other hand. Within the category of the effect indicators, by adopting an approach based 
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on “output” measures, the effectiveness of financial supervision has been investigated by 
comparing data concerning inspections, investigations and fines at securities market agencies 
of Italy, France, Spain and UK (namely Consob, AMF, CNMV and FCA). Output indica-
tors give only partial information because they do not explain whether financial institutions 
are actually making their behavior more consistent with rules and should be analyzed to-
gether with outcome indicators. Nevertheless, being aware of these limits, also in light of the 
results of the direct costs analysis, a very preliminary consideration about the effectiveness 
of financial supervision can be provided. Focusing on the above mentioned authorities in 
charge of supervision on securities markets and entrusted with the goals of transparency and 
conduct of business, it seems that the higher direct costs – especially the per capita cost of 
staff – do not correspond to a higher effectiveness of supervisory action.
Some final considerations appear extremely relevant to us from a policy perspective: 
on the one hand, we emphasize the need for a higher level of disclosure and the oppor-
tunity to set comparable reporting standards at financial authorities (including central 
banks involved in supervision); on the other hand, we regard this study as a starting 
point for a comprehensive analysis of the current financial regulatory and supervisory 
systems and their short- and medium-term evolution. As to the first point, the evidence 
provided by this study cannot be considered conclusive because, despite our efforts to 
make data as consistent as possible, our results suffer from a significant lack of consist-
ency in data availability, format and reporting. Not all supervisors provide useful and 
necessary information to assess the cost and effectiveness of their activity. In particular, 
central banks and supervisory departments housed within ministries should be required 
to make public segmental financial reporting for supervision. Furthermore, since finan-
cial authorities do not follow a standardized format, there is a huge heterogeneity in data 
provision and reporting across different countries. Therefore, efforts at both national 
and international level are required not only to increase the degree of disclosure but also 
to make the reporting systems more homogeneous. That would allow to implement 
more comprehensive cost analyses, better performance measurement and management 
systems, whose relevance cannot be understated by both financial authorities and stake-
holders, and to strengthen comparison between different authorities. 
In terms of a wider analysis of the current and future shape of financial regulation and 
supervision in Europe, we highlight that recent changes in the institutional arrangements 
entail deep cultural changes and require an overall assessment and comparison of different 
models, approaches and experiences. Regulatory and supervisory costs, with particular regard 
to compliance costs, are expected to significantly increase in the near future, especially for 
smaller supervised entities (for example, because they cannot reap economies of scale). Fur-
thermore, the complexity of the institutional structures and the fragmentation of financial 
supervision are likely to be particularly burdensome for large European and global cross-bor-
der financial institutions, which have to deal with a huge number of supervisors in different 
jurisdictions. This would cast some doubts about the effectiveness of the strategy underlying 
the complex set of reforms coming into force. From this perspective, this research can foster 
a debate between regulators, supervisors and the financial industry in order to actually share 
the rationales and objectives of these reforms, to address the issues associated with the cost 
of the new set of rules and make sure that a concrete increase in the effectiveness of financial 
regulation and supervision is consistently pursued.
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Promotori Finanziari - Anasf, Albo dei Promotori Finanziari - Apf, Associazione Operatori dei Mercati 
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THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
PAOLO GARONNA (ed.)
This book is the outcome of a study promoted by, and discussed at, the Osservatorio sulla
distribuzione ﬁnanziaria, a network of associations and stakeholders engaged in the
distribution of ﬁnancial services, of the Italian banking insurance and ﬁnance federation.
It is based on the work of a research group at the Centro Arcelli per gli Studi Monetari e
Finanziari, coordinated by Giorgio Di Giorgio of LUISS University. This work shows the
usefulness of analysing in a sound conceptual framework the impact and effectiveness of
ﬁnancial regulation, but also its enormous difﬁculties due to data gaps, lack of suitable
indicators, poor comparability of the evidence. A “promising way forward” therefore – the
volume suggests- is to build a dedicated monitoring infrastructure based on a regular
systematic and transparent collection of information and policy analysis.
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